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ABSTRACT
Instability in foreign political and social systems, changing power structures in
international relations, and growing demands by host countries for a greater control
over the operations of multinational enterprises (MNEs) have all led to the necessity
of an improved way in which to determine foreign investment opportunities. Not
surprisingly therefore, political risk assessment has become one of the fastest growing
fields of study. Being concerned with the identification, analysis, management, and
reduction of socio-political risks for foreign investors. The focus of this study is that
of political risk analysis and the way in which it impacts on investor perception and
consequently determines levels of foreign direct investment received by a particular
country.
Numerous definitions for the term "political risk" exist. Consequently, no specific
definition is regarded as being completely correct since consensus still needs to be
reached. One of the definitions used within this study is that political risk analysis is
the analysis of the possibility that factors caused or influenced by governmental
political decisions or other unforeseen events in a country will affect business
climates in such a way that investors will lose money or not make as much profit as
they expected when the initial decision to invest was made. These factors can be of
internal (from inside the host country) or external origin, and can pose macro or micro
risks. Foreign Direct Investment in brief is an investment involving a long-term
relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and control of a resident entity in one
economy in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the foreign direct
investor.
This study is a comparative between South Africa and Nigeria. South Africa and
Nigeria share many similarities, they are both resource based, African countries. They
are both fairly recent democracies, although some may contest the status of Nigeria as
being a democracy. They are also both heterogeneous states, both consisting of
various ethnic groups.
III
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Nigeria offers investors a low-cost labour pool, abundant natural resources, and a
large domestic market. However, Nigeria suffers from an inadequate and poorly
maintained infrastructure, confusing and inconsistent regulations, endemic corruption,
and a lack of confidence in the rule of law. Despite all of this, Nigeria alone accounts
for a quarter of FDI flows to Africa. In comparison, South Africa's FDI potential has
not been fully exploited. This study will discuss the possible reasons why this is the
case.
The labour market in both countries and the challenges they face are discussed in
depth within this study. Due to the fact that aside from investment, the economic
growth within a country is dependent on a variety of factors, the backbone of which is
the labour market.
In determining levels of risk within both South Africa and Nigeria, this study made
use of a political risk model. Although the intention has been to be as accurate and as
thorough as possible, it should be noted that as yet, no generalised systematic method
of conducting political risk assessment exists. Results, although extensively
substantiated, remains the interpretation of the researcher and as such remains open to
debate.
IV
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SINOPSIS
Onstabiliteit in buitelandse politieke en sosiale stelsels, veranderende mag strukture in
internasionale betrekkinge, en die groeiende behoeftes van gasheer lande om meer
beheer uit te oefen oor die funksioneering van buitelandse maatskappye het alles gelei
na die noodsaaklikheid van 'n beter manier om buitelandse investering te bepaal. Dus
is dit nie verbasend dat politieke risiko analise deesdae een van die vinnigste
ontwikkelende onderwerpe is wat bestudeer word nie. Politieke risiko analise is
belangrik vir die identifikasie, analise, bestuur en vermindering van sosio-politieke
risiko vir buitelandse investering. Hierdie studie fokus op die impak wat politieke
risiko' analise het met betrekking tot belegger waarneming en hoe dit dan ook
moontlik die bedrag van buitelandse investering wat 'n land ontvang, kan bepaal.
Daar is verskeie definisies wat die term "politieke risiko" beskryf en gevolglik moet
konsensus nog bereik word oor 'n "korrekte" een. Een van die definisies wat in hierdie
studie gebruik word is dat politieke risiko die analise is van die moontlikheid dat
sekere faktore wat veroorsaak is of wat beïnvloed is deur die regering se politieke
besluite, asook ander onvoorspelbare gebeurtenise in 'n land wat die investerings
klimaat so kan beïnvloed dat die buitelandse beleggers moontlik geld kan verloor of
miskien nie die verwagte winste behaal wat hulle aanvanklik gereken het, sou behaal
nie. Hierdie faktore kan of intern (binne die gasheer land) of ekstern van aard wees en
kan dus makro of mikro risiko behels. Direkte buitelandse investering in 'n land is 'n
belegging wat In lang termyn verhouding insluit en dit reflekteer ook 'n blywende
belangstelling en beheer van 'n buitelandse maatskappy in 'n gasheer land in.
Hierdie studie is 'n vergelykende studie tussen Suid-Afrika en Nigerië. Suid-Afrika en
Nigerië deel baie ooreenkomste. Beide lande is ryk aan natuurlike bronne en beide is
nog "jong" demokratiese lande. Sommige mense stem nie saam dat Nigerië wel aan al
die vereistes van 'n demokrasie voldoen nie. Suid-Afrika en Nigerië is ook heterogene
state wat uit verskeie etniese groepe bestaan.
v
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Nigerië bied vir die buitelandse belegger billike arbeid, oorvloedige natuurlike
bronne, asook In groot binnelandse mark. Ten spyte hiervan, moet dit ook in ag
geneem word dat Nigerië onder onvoldoende en In swak instandhouding van
infrastruktuur, wispelturige regulasies, korrupsie en ook In swak regsisteem ly. Ten
spyte van al hierdie faktore, ontvang Nigerië In kwart van alle buitelandse investering
in Afrika. Suid-Afrika se buitelandse investerings potensiaal in vergelyking met ander
lande moet nog ontwikkel word. Hierdie studie sal die moontlike redes vir Suid
Afrika se oneksploiteerbare buitelandse investerings potensiaal bespreek.
Die arbeidsmark en die uitdagings wat gestel word het In groot invloed op buitelandse
investering. Hierdie studie het ten doelom beide lande se arbeidsmark te bespreek en
te vergelyk met betrekking tot buitelandse investering.
Om die moontlike risiko in altwee lande te bepaal, maak hierdie studie gebruik van In
politieke risiko analise model. Die navorser het gepoog om so deeglik en akkuraat as
moontlik te wees. Dit moet ook in ag geneem word dat daar nog geen veralgemeende
metode van politieke risiko analise ontwikkel is nie.
VI
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Foreign Direct Investment And Political Risks In South Africa and
Nigeria: A Comparative Analysis
Chapter One: Background: Investment in South Africa; Purpose of the Study;
Conceptualisation and Methodology
1.1 Introduction
The focus of this study will be that of Foreign Direct Investment and Political Risk in
relation to both South Africa and Nigeria, specifically trying to establish why there
remains a significant difference between the two phenomenon: in the two countries
within this study. South Africa has a population of 43 million people, making it the
24th largest country in the world. Although South Africa covers less than 4% of the
African continent and accommodates less than 6% of its population, it has the most
populous and most broadly developed economy in Africa. It is also one of the most
"open" economies in the world since foreign trade accounts for a much higher share
of the gross national product than is the case in many other countries (lDC Research
Paper Series, 1997). Also from an economic policy point of view, South Africa would
appear to be a viable investment destination. Government is committed to the basic
principles of fiscal and monetary discipline. Furthermore, there has been a
fundamental shift in the approach to trade and industrial policy from an inward
oriented import substitution approach to an outward-oriented export approach.
The South African market is one of the largest unexploited markets in the world. This
market is substantial, especially if one considers the South African Development
Community (SADC). With a total population of 139 million people and a combined
gross national product (GNP) of US $150 billion, as well as Africa, south of the
Sahara, with a population of 596 million people and a combined gross national
product of US $ 286 billion. With 31% of SADC's and 7% of Sub-Saharan Africa's
(SSA) population concentrated in South Africa and with South Africa contributing
78% of SADC's and 41% of the SSA's GNP, the country is the most dominant
economy in the region. Having taken all of the above into account, South Africa
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therefore becomes the logical point of entry for foreign trade and investment in the
region (IDe Research Paper Series, 1997: 18).
1.2 Background: Investment In South Africa
Seen as the fact that South Africa has been portrayed as the ideal investment
destination from the discussion above, this section will discuss the specific
characteristics, which make South Africa so ideal. A direct investment implies a
permanent relationship between the investor and the object. The aim of a foreign
direct investment according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) definition is to
"acquire a lasting interest in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of
the investor, the investor's purpose being to have an effective voice in the
management of the enterprise (Oxelheim, 1993: 11)".
Investment is a powerful stimulus for increasing competitiveness and achieving
higher, more sustainable levels of economic growth. South Africa suffers from a very
low savings rate of approximately 16% of GDP, thus substantial amounts of foreign
investment capital and more specifically, increased foreign direct investment in
export orientated concerns are needed. South Africa has experienced an increase in
FDI flows following the constitutional changes in the early 1990s. According to
Business Map, inflows of FDI have totalled more than R40 billion since the April
1994 elections. The largest of these inflows have come from the United States,
followed by Malaysia, the United Kingdom and Germany. Transport and
telecommunications receives the most foreign direct investment, the other popular
sectors being chemicals and plastics; energy and oil; financial services; food and
beverages; hotel and leisure and gaming; manufacturing; mining and quarrying;
motor and components; pharmaceutical and medical and property (Burger, 1999: 25).
In a study undertaken by Stanford Research International (SRI) it was concluded that
South Africa's strengths as an investment site are as follows - South Africa has:
i) A good physical infrastructure including six deep-sea harbours, a
comprehensive national rail and road network, the most modern
telecommunications systems available, and one of the lowest
electricity costs in the world
ii) Trainable labour and a functioning industrial relations system
2
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South American and Eastern markets
iii) A sophisticated financial sector with well developed capital and
credit markets and a strong regional presence
iv) An accessible location, to serve the Southern African, Australian,
v) Significant natural resources
vi) A varied and well organised agricultural sector
vii) Natural assets to support tourism development
viii) A technological base and support institutions (lDC Research
Paper Series, 1997: 8).
Despite all of the above, South Africa still lags behind with regard to FDI compared
to other, less developed and politically unstable African countries. Further
impediments to FDI in South Africa include the continual fluctuations of the rand, the
situation in Zimbabwe, the AIDS pandemic as well as high levels of crime. Also
related to this, is the South African labour force, more specifically, the lack of a
highly skilled labour force, the low productivity rate of the labour force and this ties
in with the very prominent role of unionisation in South Africa under the banner of
COSATU, which could prove to be a headache for any potential investor.
1.3 South Africa and Nigeria: a Brief Comparison
Having mentioned South Africa's position with regard to FDI in relation with other
more unstable African countries, specific focus will be placed on Nigeria. Nigeria has
a population of approximately 125 million, which is growing at a rate of 3% per
annum. Nigeria also has a huge amount of natural resources, specifically in the oil
and gas sectors, being the world's 6th largest producer of oil. Nigeria and South Africa
share many similarities, they are both resource based, African countries. They are
both fairly recent democracies, South Africa, having been through two democratic
elections and Nigeria's recent most successful one in 1999, both of them having to
deal with transitional governmental systems. They are also both heterogeneous states,
consisting of various ethnic groups, South Africa has arguably managed to enforce
some degree of integration, whereas Nigeria continues to suffer from ethnic clashes
i.e. conflicts being both ethnically and religiously based. Despite this however,
3
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Nigeria continues to attract FDI to a substantial degree, the reasons as to why this is
so, will be addressed in this study.
1.4 Purpose of the Study and Research Questions
In investigating the disparity between South Africa and Nigeria with regards to
political risk and foreign direct investment, the following questions will be addressed:
1) What can South Africa, as host country do, to encourage FDI?
2) Can anything be achieved by government policies to attract FDI?
And if the answer is "yes", what constitutes a successful policy,
smee sound policies is one necessary precondition for attracting
FDI?
3) Comparatively speaking, Nigeria can be regarded as being a high-
risk country, yet it still attracts investment. This points to the risk
and reward factor which influences investment decision. Thus even
though South Africa can not be regarded as being as high a risk
country as Nigeria, the rewards, one can assume, cannot be too
attractive either. This assumption will be scrutinised in relation with
the theory of political risk.
4) Labour unions also seem to have quite a significant impact on an
investor's decision to invest or not. South Africa has very prominent
and influential labour unions e.g. COSATU, who have the ability to
seriously disrupt the economy. In relation to this there is also the
lack of highly skilled labour as well as the low productivity of the
South African labour force. To what degree do all of the above-
mentioned factors impact on FDI decisions?
4
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1.5 Conceptualisation
In this section the main terms under scrutiny will be extensively defined. Since it is
first necessary to be completely aware and therefore also be able to completely
comprehend what the focus of this study will be. Each of these terms will now be
individually discussed.
1.5.1 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
The most important way to promote foreign investment is to establish a climate of
political stability, economic growth and transparent, consistent economic policies
(Cull, 1992: 6). Gareth Elliot states that foreign direct investment is unlike other
capital flows as it entails ownership, technology transfers and is seen as a long-term
commitment to a country (Elliot, 1999: 1). Thus the difference between foreign direct
investment and foreign equity investment is that foreign direct investment does not
merely buy a stake in an enterprise but takes a direct interest in management
(Helleiner, 1990: 172-190). Also the International Monetary Fund defines foreign
direct investment to be when the investor holds 10% or more equity (i.e. share
ownership) in the enterprise. Therefore FDI's distinctive feature is control over
ownership.
Three interdependent factors influence FDI:
1) The international regulatory framework e.g. the World Bank
2) The preferences of multinational investors
3) Host country policies (Elliot, 1999: 6).
With regard to FDI one also has to distinguish between non-policy and policy factors
of the host country with regards to FDI. Non-policy factors would include political
stability and natural resources. On the other hand, policy factors would include
ownership; foreign exchange controls; technology and intellectual property rights;
investment incentives and foreign debt (Elliot, 1999: 6).
The three broad categories of FDI include the following:
1) Market Seeking FDI: intends to supply goods and services to the
Market in the country in which it is located. This type of FDI
therefore sustains, develops, protects and creates new markets.
5
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2) Cost Oriented FDI: is orientated towards providing low cost
production facilities for exports to other markets or production
facilities in foreign countries.
3) Resource Seeking FDI: intends to supply raw materials,
intermediate goods or final products to foreign markets
1996: 14; Dunning, 1994: 35).
Macro-economic policies that developing countries should adopt to promote FDI
(Narula,
include fiscal austerity; conservative monetary policies; relaxation of exchange
controls i.e. the removal of regulatory obstacles to foreign investment and states
should also promote privatisation programmes of state owned enterprises (Narula,
1996: 10).
Generally the conditions for attracting foreign investment include natural resources;
stable political regimes; large domestic markets; strong economic growth; sufficient
infrastructure and cheap labour. It is however, necessary to elaborate on some of these
factors.
Political stability is an important FDI determinant since political instability affects
FDI inflows in two ways. Firstly, investors are deterred by historical chronic political
instability and secondly, discontinuities in the political and socio-economic system,
threatens profitability. Market orientation and outward orientation is a necessary
requirement to ensure efficient use of resources and economic growth, thus also
ensuring flexibility as well as adaptability to external shocks. The Constitution of the
host country should also protect property rights including intellectual property, the
freedom to contract and should also ensure that legal obligations remain binding. The
regulatory and legal environment should be specific with clear rules. It should rule
out arbitrary decisions and "special deals" as well as guarantee equal treatment with
nationals. Economic and financial stability should be illustrated by conservative
monetary and fiscal policies, low or declining inflation and exchange rate stability.
Simplicity, consistency and predictability are also prerequisites with regard to the tax
environment of the host country i.e. relatively low corporate tax rates as well as
incentives such as tax holidays (Hirsh, 1992: 40).
6
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Furthermore the ability to repatriate profits and capital should be facilitated by no or
few exchange controls. The quality of human capital found in the host country is also
of extreme importance with specific emphasis being placed on education and training,
appropriateness of skills, low labour costs, a work ethic and productivity and
harmonious labour relations. A host country should also have a developed
infrastructure covering both physical (transport, communications, etc.) and financial
facilities (developed financial markets, insurance, legal skills, etc.). Finally, host
countries should also adopt attitudes, which encourage foreign investment. Positive
attitudes may be illustrated by a minimum of investment prescriptions and a
hospitable attitude towards foreign workers (Hirsh, 1992: 40).
Foreign Direct Investment is beneficial to host countries for a number of reasons,
namely: due to technological spin-offs, a transfer of knowledge occurs which in turn
leads to training and management expertise spin-offs and this benefits local suppliers
as well. Both direct and indirect employment is created. Competitions for local
companies increase and as a result the host country's international competitiveness
also increases (Hirsh, 1992: 35).
Foreign investment is welcomed in South Africa and virtually all business sectors are
open to investors. No governmental approval is required and there are almost no
restrictions on the form or extent of foreign investment (IDC Research Paper, 1997:
8). The government encourages investment in various ways namely: the abolition of
the dual exchange rate system effectively signalled the end of foreign exchange
control on foreigners; corporate tax rates have declined from 48% to 35% in recent
years; South Africa shares agreements with many countries for the avoidance of
double taxation; also, import tariffs are applied to encourage local industrial
development (IDC Research Paper, 1997: 8).
Characteristics which further place South Africa in a favourable light with regard to
FDI include lower foreign debt ratios; relatively sophisticated consumer, intermediate
and capital goods industries; a growing diversification and export orientation and well
developed infrastructure (economic, financial and human). As well as South Africa's
gateway to sub-equatorial Africa and last but to no account least, South Africa's
tourism potential and mineral resource endowment (IDC Research Paper, 1997: 8).
7
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1.5.2 Political Risk
Any investment is undertaken with the knowledge that a certain amount of risk is
unavoidable, no matter how far ahead one plans or how well one plans. The challenge
is therefore to retain as Iowa risk as possible and, if a low risk cannot be assured, at
least to make sure that the rewards or profits outweigh the risks to a certain extent and
thereby making the initial risk worth the investor's while. It has been stated that even
though Nigeria poses a much higher risk for investors than South Africa does,
investors are still keen to invest. From this one may therefore assume that the rewards
outweigh the risks. In understanding the full impact of political risk on investment,
one first needs to conceptualise the term.
A working definition of political risk analysis encompasses the analysis of the
possibility that factors caused or influenced by governmental political decisions or
other unforeseen events in a country will affect business climates in such a way that
investors will lose money or not make as much money as they expected when the
initial decision to invest was made. These factors can be of internal (from inside the
host country) or external origin, and can pose macro (generic) or micro (specific)
risks (Brink, 2002: 54; Bird, 1996: 20).
The term "political risks analysis" can be deconstructed as the sum of the probabilities
that specific and / or related agents will induce an unforeseen or undesirable
consequence or outcome, and that the intensity of that result might have a negative
impact on foreign business. This may be illustrated by huge financial losses, direct
physical damage to infrastructure, a decline in profitability, or threats to the safety of
operational personnel (Brink, 2002: 54; Bird, 1996: 20).
An illustration of the importance or rather the significant impact that risks have on
investors or investments can be seen in the report published by the UK-based
consultancy firm Merchant International Group in early 1999. The report estimated
that multinational companies lost about US $24 billion during 1998 in their foreign
investment activities because of specific emerging market country risks. Based on a
sample of 7,500 multinationals, the report claims that underestimating corruption,
bureaucratic delays, organised crime and other non-conventional risks on average
erode expected returns on FDI by 8 to 10percent. The report also estimates that 84%
of operations initiated over the last three years in emerging markets did not meet
8
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
financial targets, and that 26% of these projects were unsuccessful (Sader, 2000: 32).
This knowledge does not bode very well for host governments, since unsatisfied
investors usually mean no or very little investment.
Before embarking on any investment, potential investors have to evaluate certain
factors in order to ascertain whether or not an investment would be worthwhile.
Insufficient coordination and insufficient expertise are two such factors. Lack of
coordination tends to pose a particular problem in the relationship between central
government and state, provincial or municipal authorities. Conflicting signals from
the various authorities may therefore mean unnecessary delays for the potential
investor. Most governments in the developing world also tend to lack the institutional
expertise necessary to implement private infrastructure projects. The result being
detrimental repercussions for the project implementation process and the availability
of infrastructure projects for private investment (Sader, 2000: 32-75).
Corruption is another risk factor, usually under the guise of "political interference". It
is an unwritten rule that investors know that they need to have influential "business
partners", if they hope to gain a project. Corruption creeps in, in that the negotiated
deal is not to the benefit of the country as a whole, but to that of a few well-connected
individuals. An unclear market entry condition is another problem potential investors
face. This is due to the lack of clarity in the rules governing their entry and operation
in a particular sector. A related problem is whether or not market entry arrangements
and promises made by previous governments will be honoured by their successors.
Since infrastructure projects are long-term investments and thus bound to endure
through several different political leaderships, a potential lack of political
commitment is one of the greatest concerns for any investor (Sader, 2000: 32-75).
The lack of an adequate legal framework is a very relevant risk since a country's laws
often pose the greatest challenge to investors, with the result that potential investors
often do not find it profitable to invest. Protests and legal challenges spell delays and
additional costs for investors, and can possibly lead to the cancellation of projects
after lengthy preparations, therefore the incorporation of all sectors as a mechanism of
insurance against such delays should not be underestimated (Sader, 2000: 32-75).
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Having conceptualised the term "political risk" one can deduce that it is a very real
factor that any serious investor has to consider and as far as possible try and
minimise, the success of the investment being determined by his ability or inability to
do so. Governments, in their wish to become attractive investment sites, should also
take serious note of these risks and strive towards eliminating or at least reducing
them, thus ensuring that investors glance at them with a more favourable and
interested eye. It has been illustrated that even though some countries may seem to be
the epitome of high risk, they still enjoy considerable investment, Nigeria being a
case in point. This occurs, however, when the rewards outweigh the risks. This
phenomenon will also be addressed in this study.
1.5.3 Theory-Building in Political Risk
Simon (1984: 124), states that the power of a good theory lies in its ability to explain
various situations in different contexts. An incremental aspect of any theory is the
identification of the key actors and determining how their interactions can affect the
formation of political risk. Most theories regarding political risk have focused
essentially on the host government as the major actor and the MNE as the primary
target.
One theory is based on the notion that issues such as national interest, national
sovereignty, and national identity are the motivating factors behind host government
restrictions on foreign business activity. Another theory regards frustration as the key
determinant of expropriations, with the host government using the MNE as a
scapegoat for the country's problems. A third theory links type of government with a
predilection for radical political change, with newly independent states viewed as the
ones most likely to experience such change, while democratic systems are perceived
to be least likely (Simon, 1984: 125).
Brewer (1981: 5) argues that political risk assessment tends to focus on
expropriations, exchange controls, and government instability. He further contends
that these are based on a narrow notion of political risk and that they are not
necessarily the most important types of risk. Since amongst others, risk may also
include uncertainty about future tariffs, non-tariff barriers, taxes, labour relations, etc.
The problem therefore comes in that political risk very often becomes a "catchall
term" i.e. referring to miscellaneous risks that have not been defined any other way.
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This leads Brewer (1981: 5) to conclude that current political risk analysis methods
are deficient in three ways.
Firstly, they are too narrowly focused on expropriations, exchange controls, and
government instability in the developing countries. Secondly, their methods of
information collection and analysis take the form of two extremes i.e. too
impressionistic and intuitive, or too mechanistic and formalised. A third shortcoming
is that the integration of political risk assessments into capital budgeting analyses
leans towards being too simplistic (Brewer, 1981: 5). Having taken all of the above
into account one may therefore arrive at the conclusion that foreign direct investment
decisions are frequently based on political risk assessments that are both conceptually
and methodologically restricted (Brewer, 1981: 5).
1.5.4 Country Risk
Krayenbuel (1985: 3), defines country risk as being "the possibility that a sovereign
state or sovereign borrowers of a particular country may be unable or unwilling, and
other borrowers unable, to fulfil their obligations towards a foreign lender and / or
investor for reasons beyond the usual risks which arise in relation to all lending and
investments. " It should also be noted that country risk consists of both political and
transfer risk. These two terms will be explicated below.
It should be noted that cross-border transactions always involve a foreign currency
risk. It can be a foreign currency risk for the borrower only, for the lender only, or for
both. Within the context of the discussion of country risk, the foreign currency risk
that is being referred to is that of the borrower. This risk may manifest itself in two
ways. One risk is that of parity adjustments. This means that the borrower has to pay
a substantially different amount in local currency than was due when he contracted
his obligation. The other risk is that at the time of payment, the borrower cannot remit
the foreign currency because the authorities of his country have introduced
corresponding foreign currency remittance regulations i.e. relating to the borrower's
liability in foreign currencies. The above examples of origins of country risk,
illustrate how the investor may encounter a form of country risk which stems from the
economic policies of the country in which he chooses to invest in (Krayenbuel, 1985:
12; Andrews, 1995: 26-27).
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A contributing factor of country risk includes the difficulty of dialogue between the
investor and the country in which he chooses to invest and this factor may be
exacerbated by distance, cultural problems and language problems. Related to this is
the fact that cross-border transactions entail a higher legal risk because the laws of
more than one country are involved (Krayenbuel, 1985: 12; Andrews, 1995: 26-27).
It has also been illustrated that country risk may manifest itself in three
interdependent ways. At the lowest level country risk may only result in a delay in the
payment of interest. This is already an indicator that the investor should exercise
some form of caution since a delay in payment may be the first sign of future
difficulties for the country in question. This delay in payment aggravates country risk
in that it may lead to a continued inability of a country to honour its debts. Leading on
from this the worst-case scenario regarding country risk is where a country repudiates
its debts. This occurs when the country refuses to honour its debts on the grounds that
it no longer accepts them. Not many countries resort to this option since it inherently
means complete isolation from the international and economic communities
(Krayenbuel, 1985: 14).
1.5.5 Political Risk and Political Instability
As discussed above, Country Risk consists of both political and transfer risk.
According to Krayenbuel (1985: 3), political risk is the risk that investors face when
that country, in which they invest, restricts the repatriation of their investment.
Transfer risk is a related factor in that the country invested in may impose restrictions
on remittances of capital, dividends, etc. to investors as part of its economic policy
(Krayenbuel, 1985: 3).
Political risk is usually associated with political turmoil and revolution. Embargo or
boycott measures instituted for whatever reason can mean a substantial change in the
foreign currency reserve position of a country. In relation to this, labour unrest and
nationalisation tie in with political risk and consequently then also country risk
thereby increasing the overall risk for an investor (Krayenbuel, 1985: 12).
Political risk is generally equated with political instability and has for the most part
been analysed in the same vein as that of political instability. Sethi and Luther (1986:
58) however, argue that political risk as it affects business investment decisions,
cannot be equated simply with political instability such as a change in government.
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Furthermore, political instability has different connotations in different socio-cultural
frameworks. The conclusion that they arrive at is that any measure of political risk,
based on some index of political instability would lead to erroneous findings and
consequently would have very little, if any, practical value (Sethi, 1986: 58).
Kobrin (1978: 113) states that most managers rank political instability and / or
political risk as one of the most important factors in decisions on foreign direct
investment. He emphasises however, that political instability, depending on how it is
defined, is a distinct, yet related, occurrence to that of political risk. This distinction
between the two concepts is further illustrated by stating that political instability is a
characteristic of the environment, while political risk is a characteristic of the firm.
Therefore leading to the conclusion that investors should only be interested in
political instability to the extent of its impact on the investment (Kobrin, 1978: 114).
Howard (1993: 69) substantiates Kobrin's argument. Emphatically stating that
political instability is not political risk, does not automatically create political risk,
and certainly is not the only source of political risk. Agreeing also however, that
political instability has the potential to create events that are of the type to have an
effect on business in general and foreign direct investments in particular. It is for this
reason therefore that a study of instability may provide useful information for
political risk analysis (Howard, 1993: 69). The impact of political instability as an
indicator of political risk is further debatable by two conclusions. First it has to be
noted that instability is a culturally rather than universally specific occurrence.
Related to this is the fact that events may only be regarded as being irregular and
destabilising to the extent that they violate established role expectations in a given
political system. A second conclusion reached is that any irregular political event
does not necessarily mean that the operations of a foreign company will be adversely
affected (Kobrin, 1978: 120). These conclusions are important to grasp since they
may influence an investors decision to the extent that they may choose to avoid
investing at all just due to the perceived risk outweighing the level which they have
deemed as being acceptable. The result is therefore that the flow of foreign direct
investment is constrained and this in tum means that both the potential investor and
the potential host country lose out.
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1.5.6 The Impact of the Stage of Economic Development and the Degree
of Openness of the Host Country's Political System
To a certain extent, the nature of political risk will depend upon both the intent and
the capabilities of key actors to amend events. In tum, this will stem from certain
attributes of the host country, specifically but again not exclusively, one here has to
refer to the particular stage of economic development in which the host country finds
itself. As well as the degree of openness of the political system which, is portrayed by
the host country (Simon, 1984: 127).
Simon (1984: 130) argues that the degree of openness in the society is an important
aspect of political risk due to the fact that it explains the tendency and capability of
non-governmental actors to shape events. The distinction arises from the fact that in
an open society, expressions of discontent can be constructively aired in non-violent
ways i.e. elections, protests, boycotts, etc. In closed societies on the other hand, a
mechanism of expression does not exist. As a result, these kinds of societies may
therefore resort to violence as the only means of expression available to them.
This study focuses on South Africa and Nigeria both countries to a certain extent may
be regarded as being open-developing countries. Even though some countries or
organisations may regard South Africa as being a developed country, the income
inequality and economic disparities within the country do not allow it to be classified
as such. In open-developing countries, the need to promote economic self-sufficiency
increases the likelihood of host government local content and technology transfer
requirements, as well as import/export regulations. It should be noted that open-
developing countries are not without social upheavals i.e. strikes; protests and
boycotts against MNEs are likely to occur due to the struggle for economic benefits.
However, the openness of the system does allow for societal dissatisfaction to have a
peaceful outlet (Simon, 1984: 131). It should be noted however, that both in South
Africa and Nigeria dissatisfied workers have extensively made use of strikes, protests
and boycotts to vent their dissatisfaction.
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Simon argues that the most serious indirect external risk facing MNEs in developing
countries, whether they be open or closed systems, stems from the problem of
mounting external debt. This has an effect on both the host country's economy and the
stability of the international financial system. It has also been argued that external
debt is not the result of internal problems, rather it is due to external factors beyond
the control of the developing country e.g. inflated prices for energy products, non-oil
commodity price fluctuations, etc. (Simon, 1984: l34). It is no secret that Nigeria's
external debt has to a large extent crippled the economy and continues to impede real
growth. In the case of Nigeria, alongside the usual reasons given above for this
occurrence, Nigeria has struggled and continues to struggle with corruption and this
has no doubt influenced the state of its current external debt.
1.5.7 Growth Employment and Redistribution Plan (GEAR)
The economic policies that host governments choose to implement have a significant
impact when it comes to attracting foreign direct investment. In June 1996, the South
African government introduced a macro-economic strategy i.e. GEAR, which had a
number of objectives. It was the purpose of this plan to implement an overall macro-
economic environment conducive to growth and an expanding domestic and regional
market; the gradual removal of exchange controls; improve domestic savings;
restructure state assets so as to create opportunities for equity investment in public
corporations by foreign partners; improve labour market flexibility and increasing
training for a more skilled and productive workforce; reduce crime and social stability
as well as create favourable incentives to promote investment in manufacturing (IDe
Research Paper Series, 1997: 8).
Although government set out with the best intentions, this proposal was idealistic to
say the least. Although few of the objectives have been attained to a certain degree,
most of the proposed objectives have not nearly come close to fruition. Arguably
therefore, GEAR has for the most part been unsuccessful.
1.5.8 Manufacturing Development Programme (MDP)
Following on the release of GEAR, government also introduced the Manufacturing
Development Programme (MDP), to ensure increased levels of domestic and foreign
direct investment in the future. The MDP is aimed at: raising fixed investment in
manufacturing; restructuring domestic manufacturing towards international
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competitiveness; facilitating a higher degree of labour absorption and encouraging
small and medium-sized manufacturing. The incentives are equally accessible to local
and foreign firms and their favourable impact on investment returns should promise a
significant stimulus to investment in South African manufacturing (Burger, 1999: 26).
1.5.9 Unionisation
Unionisation is of particular importance when analysing a particular industry for
investment. Furthermore, given that union involvement in the decision making
process is likely to increase, it is important to take account of the various union
representations as well as agreements that may be reached with specific unions and
industries. Labour unions are a way of life for most South Africans, protecting
workers from exploitation both national and foreign. COSATU, the predominant
labour union in South Africa, has immense power to rally supporters in such a way to
bring the economy to a standstill and they also enjoy close ties with government.
Their overriding influence however, has made most investors cautious and even
weary to invest, here again a reflection of the risks outweighing the rewards (Barret,
1996: 42).
1.5.10 The Labour Relations Act
Another important agreement that has a significant impact on industries and therefore
also on foreign investment, is the Labour Relations Act. The Act essentially covers all
employers and employees except the National Defence Force, the South Africa Secret
Service and the National Intelligence Agency. The Act establishes a number of trade
union organisational rights namely: the right to information for collective bargaining
and other legitimate purposes; the right to time off for union activities; the right to
select trade union representatives and the right to stop order facilities, amongst others.
The Act also makes provision for the compulsory establishment of workplace forums
under specified circumstances. These forums have legitimate functions, including
communication and decision making powers. It is intended to introduce worker-
participation and elements of employee co-determination into the South African
industrial relations system (Burgher, 1999: 64-65).
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1. 6 Methodology
This research report will primarily make use of qualitative data sources of, which will
be found in various subject-related books, magazines, newspaper as well as journal
articles. With regard to economic and political policies that will be investigated with
regard to foreign direct investment, government publications will also be utilised, the
Internet will also be a prominent source of information, especially as a way of
ensuring that changing trends or new information will not be overlooked.
As mentioned, this study will make use of qualitative data collection with the
dimensions of research focussing on that of descriptive and explanatory research.
Descriptive research aims to present a picture of the specific details of a situation or
social setting. In descriptive research one begins with a well-defined subject which
one has to conduct research on to describe it accurately. Descriptive research focuses
on "how" and "who" questions (Neuman, 1999:22; Babbie, 1995: 80). In this study
therefore the particular subjects that will come under scrutiny will be that of foreign
direct investment and political risk, particularly "how" foreign direct investment is
influenced by political risk.
Explanatory research builds on descriptive research and identifies the reason a
particular phenomenon occurs. Explanatory research therefore seeks causes and
reasons. The purpose of explanatory research is to find out "why" something occurs
(Neuman, 1999: 22-23; Babbie, 1995: 82). This study will therefore aim to explain
why foreign direct investment is influenced by political risk.
Quantitative research is followed on a more linear path than is qualitative research.
Meaning that a linear research path follows a fixed sequence of steps. Qualitative
research is more non-linear and cyclical (Neuman, 1999: 124).
This study is a comparative analysis of foreign direct investment and political risk in
South Africa and Nigeria. These two countries were specifically chosen because to
some extent they are both economic giants on the African continent. South Africa
dominates southern Africa economically and Nigeria is not only the most populous
African nation, it is also the economic forerunner in West Africa.
17
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The focus of comparative research is on similarities and differences between units, in
this case states. Comparative research is useful because it gives rise to a broader
perspective of political and socio-economic phenomena and behaviour. The reason
for comparing countries has been attributed to four main objectives, all of which co-
exist and are mutually reinforcing in any systematic comparative study. The four
main objectives include contextual description, which allows political scientists to
know how other countries function. Classification simplifies the political world and
this in tum assist political scientists in their hypothesis-testing and subsequently in
their predictions of a country's political and economic future (Kopstein, 2000: 22;
Mahler, 1995: 8; Peters, 1988: 5).
Comparative research also has limitations. It is more difficult, more costly and more
time consuming than research that is not comparative. The types of data that can be
collected and problems with equivalence are also frequent problems. Another
limitation is that comparative research can only apply, not test theory, and can make
only limited generalisations (Neuman, 1999: 401-402; Mahler, 1995: 12; Peters,
1988:8).
It has been the experience of this researcher that the above claims are true. Firstly,
relevant data is not freely available or easily accessible, especially with regards to
Nigeria. Gaining data is also relatively expensive and the fact that it is usually only
segments of a particular article that is relevant makes it even more so and extremely
frustrating as well. Another problem relating to data collection that has been
experienced by this researcher is the lack of up to date and reliable data. This is
especially true when one is doing research on an African country. Statistics on
Nigeria remain problematic since they are very rarely reliable and vary quite a bit
from one article to the next and they are not easily attained. Therefore even though
this is a comparative study, this researcher found it challenging to compare certain
aspects of the two countries on a strict line by line basis.
1.7 Outline of Remaining Chapters
This research study will consist of six chapters. The first chapter will consist of the
problem statement, the conceptualisation of key terms that will be addressed in the
study, the methodology that the study will use as well as a chapter outlay of the study.
The second chapter will address recent trends of foreign direct investment in Africa,
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specifically South Africa and Nigeria. The chapter will also discuss political and
economic policies that South Africa has adopted with regard to foreign direct
investment as well as South Africa's relationship with international financial
institutions i.e. The International Monetary Fund (IMF); The World Bank and the
World Trade Organisation. The third chapter will discuss South Africa's labour
market, focussing on the impact of unionisation and the role which trade unions
played in the transition to democracy as well as the various factors which presently
affect the labour market i.e. the labour relations act; labour market flexibility;
unemployment; education and training; labour productivity; the AIDS pandemic;
affirmative action; strikes and crime. The fourth chapter will address the Nigerian
labour market in comparison with that of the South African labour market i.e.
comparing certain aspects of the two labour markets in the respective countries.
Having discussed the various attributes of the labour market within the two countries
and thus having formed a foundation, the fifth chapter will discuss the aspect of
political risk within the two countries. First discussing the concept of political risk
and then applying the impact which it has had in the two countries and how it has
affected investor perception and therefore influenced the level of foreign direct
investment received in the respective countries. Chapter six will be the concluding
chapter, summarising the findings of the study and whether or not the findings help to
answer the questions posed in the problem statement.
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Foreign Direct Investment And Political Risks In South Africa and
Nigeria: A Comparative Analysis
Chapter Two: South African Policies Impacting On Foreign Direct Investment
2.1 Introduction
The shortage of capital is a major obstacle to growth and development in Africa.
Africa's share of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows is not only miniscule but it is
also declining. In 1985, Africa received 3.1% of total global FDI flows, but by 1997,
this figure had dropped to only 1,9%. Inflows to Africa are concentrated in a few
mainly large and resource-rich countries. Over 60% of FDI inflows to Africa were
concentrated in Nigeria, Egypt, South Africa and Morocco. Nigeria alone, accounts
for a quarter of FDI flows to the continent. This shouldn't really be surprising since
Nigeria is one of the world's primary oil exporters and as such it emphasises the
central role of the primary commodities sector, and especially oil and gas, as a
magnet for FDI (African Development Report, 2000: 29).
Despite its relative competitive strengths that include the prevalence of Western
business culture, the widespread use of English and excellent infrastructure, South
Africa still fails to attract substantial or even sufficient amounts of foreign direct
investment. Which is in fact necessary to boost output and employment. Statistics
show that for 1999 alone, foreign direct investment amounted to about 1% of GDP
(Gross Domestic Product) and is widely regarded as too low to improve the long-run
growth and labour absorption capacity of the economy (Business Africa, 2000: 2). In
other words, foreigners are happy to lend money to South Africa; since there is
political stability and disciplined economic management, and that some international
credit rating agencies have classified South Africa as a highly acceptable
"investment-grade" risk. Yet, they are much less keen to pump investment risk capital
in the country.
Governmental investment friendly policies and international relations can go a long
way in impacting on the perception that foreign investors have of a particular country
and as such the level of foreign direct investment that they are willing to invest in a
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country. This chapter will address the specific aspects concerning policies that impact
on the level of FDI in South Africa. The discussion will focus on the Reconstruction
and Development Programme (RDP) of 1994, the Growth Employment and
Redistribution (GEAR) plan of 1996 as well as the most recent plan, the New
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Which South Africa's President,
Thabo Mbeki, is one of the founding fathers of, therefore giving South Africa an
important stake in this plan. An element of South Africa's international relations
includes its relationship with the international financial institutions. Specifically, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade
Organisation (WTO). Discussion of the above is essential to place South Africa's
position in the global economy in context and which as such determines the level of
and impact of the FDI, which the country receives.
2.2 The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)
The RDP outlined a nation-building strategy driven by public investment to meet
basic human needs. It promised housing, sanitation, health care, and education for
South Africa's long-disenfranchised majority. The RDP also called for a massive job
creation programme via public works, a large-scale land redistribution programme,
and a national strategy to extend electrification, telecommunications, clean water, and
adequate public transportation to the entire country. At the same time, the RDP
strongly endorsed labour rights, wanting a process in which citizens played an active
role in the program's implementation. In short therefore, the RDP represented a
comprehensive social reform programme (Williamson, 2001: 22).
2.3 The Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) Plan
In contrast to the RDP, the GEAR plan is a testimonial to economic orthodoxy. It was
also considered by the American state department as being evidence of South Africa's
acceptance of free market principles. The South African Government announced the
GEAR plan as part of its macro-economic strategy and it was regarded as being a
state of the art framework for sustainable economic growth and development with an
outward-orientation. Central to this strategy was the enhancement of non-gold export
performance, increased private sector investment, particularly aimed at increasing
labour opportunities, development of infrastructure and improved service delivery
(Swart, 1996: 7-8).
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· This growth strategy envisioned that by the turn of the century a number of goals
would have been achieved namely: a 6% per annum real economic growth rate will
be sustained; 400 000 job opportunities will be created annually; manufactured
exports will increase by more than 10% per annum and the investment rate will have
increased to 25% of gross domestic product (GDP) (Swart, 1996: 7-8).
South Africa is competing for limited FDI against numerous emerging countries
throughout the world. In response, the Government is endeavouring to create an
investor-friendly environment in an attempt to attract more foreign direct investment.
The release of the macro-economic strategy (GEAR) by the South African
government amounted to an important step in this direction. The GEAR plan was
aimed at attaining numerous objectives namely: creating an overall macro-economic
environment conducive to growth and an expanding domestic and regional market;
the gradual removal of exchange control; improving domestic saving; restructuring
state assets so as to create opportunities for equity investment in public corporations
by foreign partners; improving labour market flexibility and increasing training for a
more skilled and productive workforce; reducing crime and improving social stability
and last but not least, creating favourable incentives to promote investment in
manufacturing (Swart, 1996: 7-8).
It has been argued that it would be wrong to say that GEAR had no redistribution
content. Since the document called for continued progressive taxation, a
reprioritization of public spending to better help the poor, and improvements in public
infrastructure. Yet the aim of correcting the inequalities of apartheid was
subordinated to the goal of boosting economic growth. It must also be taken into
account that in essence, for GEAR'S authors, promoting economic growth meant
greater fiscal discipline, lower tariffs, fewer exchange rate controls, and greater
labour flexibility. With the goal, to build South Africa, as an export power and create
a favourable environment for corporate-led growth (Williamson, 2001: 2).
2.4 The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)
NEP AD is an amalgamation of South Africa's Millennium Partnership for the African
Recovery Programme (MAP) and OMEGA plan, finalised on July 3, 2001. Out of the
merger, the New African Initiative (NAI) was born. NAI, approved by the OAU,
Summit Heads of State and Governments in Lusaka on July 11 2001. NAI received
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endorsement from the leaders of G8 countries on July 20. Its policy framework was
finalised on October 23, forming the NEPAD (Nevin, 2002: 35).
One of the key elements of the NAI I NEPAD is the attraction of greater volumes of
investment and aid from the developed countries. South Africa, given its low
domestic savings rate, requires substantial amounts of foreign direct investment to
reach its employment and economic growth targets (Sidiropoulos and Voges, 20011
2002: 252). With NEPAD, Africa is offering to move away from a relationship of
dependency with the developed world and replace it with one of development
between equals through co-operation, mutual understanding and partnership in the
global economy. The challenge NEPAD lays down to the developed world is for them
to provide Africa with the tools to do the job. These tools include debt relief,
development aid and increased and easier access for African products into the
markets of developed countries. NEPAD stipulates that Africa must first establish
peace, security, democracy, human rights and good political and economic
governance on free market principles. In return the G8 countries will set aside 0.7%
of gross domestic product a year for official development assistance (Nevin, 2002:
35).
2.4.1 The Aims and Prospective Outcomes ofNEPAD
To fully comprehend what the exact aims of NEPAD consists of, a brief, but all-
inclusive breakdown of its particular components are necessary. To ensure sustainable
development the following criteria are necessary: peace, security, democracy and
political governance; economic and corporate governance as well as regional co-
operation and integration. In its outline, NEPAD aims to focus on what has been
regarded as priority sectors namely: infrastructure; information and communication
technology; human development focusing on health, education and skills
development as well as agriculture and the promotion of diversification of production
and exports. Related to this is a specific set of developmental goals including: to
achieve and sustain growth rates of seven percent for the next 15 years; to reduce the
number of those living in poverty by half by 2015; to enrol all children of school age
in primary school by 2015 and to implement sustainable development strategies by
2005, that will reverse the loss of environmental resources by 2015 (Mills & Hughes,
200112002: 140).
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With all of the above taken into account, the anticipated outcomes include i)
economic growth and development and increased employment, ii) reduction in
poverty and inequality, iii) diversification of productive activities, enhanced
international competitiveness and increased exports as well as iv) increased African
integration (Mills & Hughes, 2001/2002: 140).
With the above-stipulated goals, it should however, be realistically noted that for
them to reach fruition, Africa's economies need to grow by at least 7-8% in real terms
annually. At the moment, this is far above their average performance of 2,2% in the
years 1991-97. Relating factors is the level of investment, which would have to rise
from 16% of GDP to 22%-25% over the next decade, as well as aid, which would
have to increase by $10 billion annually. At present what impedes this already
gigantic initiative, is the fact that aid flows are less than half of what they were two
decades ago. Also, due to bad governance, being one factor amongst many, foreign
direct investment to Africa dropped by 13% between 1999-2000, accounting for less
than one percent of global capital flows (Mills & Hughes, 2001/2002: 143).
2.4.2 Potential Deficiencies of the NEPAD Plan
NEPAD has inherent weaknesses and pitfalls which have up until now been
categorised into six challenges, each of which will now be discussed.
It should firstly be recognised that one of the integral strengths of the NEP AD is also
one of its major weaknesses. In order to achieve its goals, the NEPAD in fact assumes
a restructuring of the power relationship between Africa and the economically
advanced Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries. So much so that an analogy has been drawn with the post-Second World
War Marshall Plan to reconstruct Europe. The difference however, lies in the fact that
Africa is marginal to the OECD while Europe was pivotal to world reconstruction.
Relatedly, Europe provided an attractive return on investment after the war, not so the
case in Africa, since at the present moment there is no compelling need for OECD
countries to risk capital in Africa. The end of the Cold War adding to this
disincentive, since there is no longer the need to invest in certain African countries for
ideological and military reasons. Here it should be noted that should the OECD
countries fail to become fully-fledged partners in the NEPAD, the most ambitious
programmes will not meet their targets (Mills & Hughes, 2001/2002: 144).
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Even though the programme priotises the importance of good governance. Economic
management and self-reliance, the mechanisms for translating this into concrete
action, still remain vague. At present, no political mechanism for co-ordinating the
NEP AD exists, posing therefore a third potential problem. NEP AD has also for the
most part remained a concoction dreamt up by state leaders i.e. being a top-down,
teclmocratic process in which Parliaments and the public have both had very little
say. The fifth point of dispute relates to the above. NEPAD has undertaken a macro
policy approach with the aim of integrating external and internal policy action, this
may be problematic in that it may overlook the more simple policy issues that African
states can do something about in isolation e.g. cultivating good governance. It should
also be noted that public and private support for the NEP AD is inevitably and
immediately linked to specific perceptions of the region, and more general
perceptions of the continent as a whole. This entails confidence in the ability of
African states to regulate and, if necessary, sanction errant behaviour. Which they
have not yet been able to do successfully, the Zimbabwe situation being a case in
point. Having been unable to thus far reduce perceptions of risk, is one of the reasons
explaining why sub-Saharan states have been able to attract on average only four
percent of private global capital flows. This is disheartening when one considers the
fact that in 1999, rates of return on investment in Africa were the highest worldwide
(Mills & Hughes, 2001/2002: 147).
2.4.3 What makes NEPAD Different from Previous Plans?
Previous plans failed because they simply comprised wish lists that the African
countries presented to the rich world (Nevin, 2002: 35). What also sets it apart from
other previous African initiatives are both its strict criteria for membership of the
NEPAD club and the potential sanction of deviants, as well as the apparently highly
technical nature of many of the projects (Mills & Hughes, 200112002: 144). In
essence, NEP AD provides three new elements i.e. it is African developed - managed
and owned, it brings the concept of a new partnership into play and Africa is
undertaking commitments and obligations in its own interests which are not
externally, imposed conditions (Nevin, 2002: 35).
The first priority however, is to address investor perception of Africa as a high-risk
continent, especially with regard to security of property rights, regulatory framework
and markets.
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2.5 South Africa And The International Financial Institutions
The global economy over the years has undergone a significant amount of substantial
and unpredictable structural change that has had a serious impact on the system as a
whole. Examples of these include the collapse of the fixed exchange rate system, the
Southern debt crisis, increasingly protectionist policies, etc. South Africa has not been
immune to these changes. International finance has been an important factor in South
African economic development since the beginning of the country's industrialisation.
In the 1980s, international financial flows dried up due to poor economic
performance, the impact of sanctions, and the global debt crisis. However, since the
transition to democracy, the IMF, World Bank, and private and public foreign
investors and institutions have returned to the country. However, economic growth
remains slow and employment remains stagnant (Shrivastava, 2000/2001: 146). The
remainder of this chapter will now focus on South Africa's relations with the above-
mentioned international financial institutions.
2.5.1 The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
The IMF began as a multilateral organisation that administered the international
monetary system. Since the collapse of the fixed exchange rate system in 1971, the
IMF has assumed two different roles. It has now become an organisation that
conducts research and offers advice on macro-economic policies to member states,
and a supplier of loans to governments. The IMF as an organisation therefore has two
focal points i.e. preparing of confidential internal macro-economic analysis of its
members' economies as well as carrying out missions that negotiate lending
programmes (Shrivastava, 2000/2001: 146). This background to the organisation was
necessary in order to establish the impact that the organisation has on investor
perception of countries. Since the organisation has such an overriding influence on
monetary policies in countries it has been known to be a benchmark by which
potential investors decide to invest or not.
During 1998, South Africa experienced serious foreign exchange market pressures,
largely as a result of contagion from other emerging market economies. Starting in
July 1998, the authorities kept monetary policy consistently tight, refrained from
intervention in foreign exchange markets to defend the currency, and maintained
course on fiscal policy. Because of these policies and an improved global
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environment, the authorities regained investors' confidence, which led to a resumption
of capital flows. Despite this however, the trend of decline in formal private sector
employment continued in 1998 and 1999, therefore, the official unemployment rate,
which was 22% in 1997, probably increased. While headline inflation fell from nine
percent in December 1998 to 2.6% in January 2000 (Shrivastava, 2000/2001: 147).
South Africa's position in the IMF is relatively comfortable. However, evidence of
stabilisation of market conditions, a strengthening of public finances and an
improvement in external accounts is not enough. Shrivastava (2000/2001: 148) argues
that broad-based economic recovery in South Africa requires the authorities to raise
growth potential to facilitate job creation and improve living standards of the poorer
sections of the country. Furthermore, an urgent need exists to generate high and
sustainable output and employment growth, to increase the skills of the labour force,
and encourage domestic investment in conjunction with attracting foreign investment,
while also enhancing efficiency. The IMF recommends reforms, most notably in the
areas of trade liberalisation, privatisation and the labour market, to meet this
challenge. Despite privatisation gaining momentum in South Africa with the sale of
20% of South African Airways in June 1999, the IMF still regards the process of
privatisation as being too slow in South Africa. It is worth mentioning that
privatisation revenues help to reduce debt and contribute to higher productivity
growth, therefore privatisation should continue to remain a South African priority
(Shrivastava, 2000/2001: 149).
It should also be recognised that the initiatives that came out of the 1998 Job Summit
emphasised the importance for change in certain aspects of the labour market policy
to encourage job creation for the unskilled. The IMF has pointed to the importance of
implementing two measures proposed in the Growth, Employment and Redistribution
Strategy (GEAR) that have yet to be carried out. These are the scaling down of wages
for young trainees and the granting of greater discretion to the minister of labour to
limit the extension of centrally negotiated wage agreements. It should also be taken
into account that the effect of privatisation and labour market reforms on job losses
must be recognised and addressed by policies in such areas as social safety nets,
education and training (Shrivastava, 2000/2001: 149).
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2.5.2 The World Bank
The World Bank's perception of or relationship with a country also acts as one of the
deciding factors investors use when deciding whether or not to invest in a particular
country. Like the IMF, the World Bank brings together in one organisation a myriad
of activities. Though its core functions remain lending, development research and
development assistance. South Africa was a founding member of the IBRD in 1944.
It later became a member of the International Development Association in 1960,
joining the International Finance Corporation (IFC) in 1957, and the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) in 1994. South Africa has a fairly good record
with the World Bank as well. Between 1953 and 1966, South Africa took out eleven
loans from the Bank (four for electricity projects and seven for transportation).
Records show that the last of these loans was closed in 1968 and all amounts have
been fully paid. Currently, the Bank focuses on poverty alleviation and reduction of
inequality, as well as on economic growth in South Africa. MIGA has also issued
guarantees for three investments in South Africa as well as two investments by South
African corporation in neighbouring countries (Shrivastava, 200012001: 150).
2.5.3 The World Trade Organisation (WTO)
The core activity of the WTO relates to the negotiation and implementation of explicit
rules on government policies relating to cross-border trade. While the World Bank
and the IMF have considerable influence because of their resources and the fact that
they deal predominantly with developing countries, the WTO deals with relations
between countries. Further it also differs from the World Bank and the IMF in that it
is a rule-making and rule-enforcing organisation (Shrivastava, 2000/2001: 150).
South Africa achieved a breakthrough in its efforts to form a trading bloc to push for
the needs of developing countries when it officially launched a developing nation
trade bloc with Brazil, India, Nigeria and Egypt. Furthermore, South Africa and
Brazil are also exploring the possibility of a free trade agreement between Latin
American trade bloc Mercosur and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).
Mercosur includes Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Argentina, while SACU consists of
South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland (Shrivastava, 2000/2001:
151). Since the late 1980s when South Africa re-entered the global capital markets,
the impact of international financial institutions on its economic philosophy has
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increased. More recently, the South African economy, similar to other developing
nation economies, has been influenced by three developments. Firstly, the movement
in commodity prices i.e. the persistent weakness of non-oil commodity prices
continues to constrain growth.
Secondly, increased pressures for structural reforms i.e. these lead to increased
privatisation, public sector reforms and other structural measures for improved fiscal
control. Third and finally, various improvements in trade and political co-operation,
including tariff reductions, regional and extra-regional trade agreements, bilateral
trade liberalisation measures, etc. (Shrivastava, 2000/200 1: 152).
2.6 Conclusion
For South Africa the ultimate test of economic performance will be the creation of
meaningful jobs through an increase in both domestic fixed investment and foreign
direct investment. This requires an effective and shrewd combination of a range of
policies and practices that need to be implemented in pursuit of a common economic
and social development agenda and goal.
From a macro-economic policy and management point of view, South Africa's
prospects in the global economy, are good. Sound economic fundamentals are in
place. However, the country's ability to build and sustain a growing and competitive
economy, and to create jobs and prosperity for aU, rests on several factors. First, the
role of the South African Reserve Bank will continue to be crucial, due to the integral
role of monetary policy in the management of any economy. A second factor points
to the signing of the South Africa - EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the lifting
of sanctions on Libya after South Africa facilitated the handing over of the two
Lockerbie suspects, these successes need to be maximised to improve the country's
economic strength. And the final factor on which South Africa's prospects in the
world rests upon, is the geopolitics and economics of the southern African region.
Botswana is positioning itself as one of the most attractive and worthwhile places for
foreign direct investment in southern Africa. Yet civil wars and the current volatile
situation in Zimbabwe do not bode well for regional economic growth, security and
prosperity (Dlamini, 1999/2000: 2).
The aim of the above discussion was to highlight the various government policies and
programmes that impact on foreign direct investment. The relationship which South
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Africa and Nigeria respectively has with the international financial institutions was
also highlighted. This was necessary in that these institutions have a significant
impact on investor perception of a particular country and may therefore influence
investors' decision on whether or not to invest in a country. As in the case of Nigeria,
which suffers from an overwhelming debt problem, investor risk also immediately
increases that much more. And since being given the cold shoulder by the IMF,
potential investors may follow suite since the reaction of the IMF may be regarded as
being justified.
The following section of this paper will discuss the aspect and influence of
unionisation in South Africa in relation to the South African Labour Market. South
Africa's body of unions under the umbrella organisation of COSATU played a crucial
role in the transition process of government. South Africa has always had a very
prominent union movement which has gained influence so much so, that it is
currently represented in parliament. This has been both advantageous and
disadvantageous, since the prominent role that it has come to play has now started to
act as a deterrent to foreign investors. Related to this is the South African Labour
Market, who although in abundant supply, has its own inherent problems. These
problems include education and training, strike demonstrations that occur from time
to time, the quota system and arguably the most pressing problem of all, the high rate
of HIV -AIDS infection amongst the labour force, which in fact has the potential to
completely cripple if not wipe out the entire labour force.
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Foreign Direct Investment And Political Risks In South Africa and
Nigeria: A Comparative Analysis
Chapter Three: Unionisation And The South African Labour Market
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter aimed to highlight the relevant and vanous policies that
government has in place in order to facilitate foreign investment. Mention was also
made of South Africa's relationship with the international financial institutions. This
was deemed necessary since investors are known to make certain investment
decisions based on the perception that is created by the relationship between a
particular country and these institutions.
According to a report by think-tank Business Map (Corporate Location 2000: 2),
foreign direct investment into South Africa in 2000 was 1.986 billion U.S. dollars,
52% down from its 1999 level of 4.092 billion dollars. The 2000 figure has been the
lowest since 1994 when apartheid was brought to an end. Furthermore, a study
conducted by A.T. Kearney (Corporate Location, 2000: 2), which focused on the
perception of foreign investors about the potential of South Africa to be a location for
investment relates to the above. Half of the current foreign investors interviewed
reported that their companies are meeting profit targets while an astounding 91%
reported that there is a significant likelihood that they will expand their South African
business (Corporate Location, 2000: 2).
The study also found that non-investors displayed very little knowledge of the
country together with a great deal of apathy. In the study, 39% of respondents
claimed to have low levels of knowledge of the country and its FDI potential. With
the group of uninformed respondents, only 14% said they have a positive view of the
country, while a third saw the country negatively. Half of all companies without
investments in the country said that there is a low likelihood of them investing in
South Africa in the near future (Corporate Location, 2000: 2). The study singles out
the limited domestic market as a reason for the response. Most companies see the
local market as a determining factor in deciding where to place FDI. The inflexible
labour market is cited by 66% of current foreign investors as the main obstacle to
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investment. Companies complain of having little power to lay-off workers as well as
finding appropriate black staff to fill quotas set by the employment equity legislation,
since although there is a willingness to comply with the legislation, the skills remain
lacking (Corporate Location, 2000: 2).
Unionisation also continues to play an integral role within the spheres of the South
African labour market. Trade Union Membership in South Africa has grown steadily
since the early eighties. There was a slight dip during the period 1993 to 1995, largely
as a result of retrenchments and the downturn in the economy. The Department of
Labour reported in its 1998 Annual Report that registered union membership had
increased by approximately 11% from 3.4 million members to 3.8 million in 1998.
This increase can be attributed to a number of factors: the Labour Relations Act
(1995) has encouraged growth in previously unorganised areas such as the
Government, agricultural and domestic sectors. Also, with the simplification of
registration procedures, more unions are registering to gain the advantages of so
doing, such as the right to participate in bargaining councils (South Africa Yearbook,
2000/200 1).
Total membership compnses approximately 30.8% of the estimated 15,8 million
economically active population. The most important trade union groups or federations
are the Federation of Unions of South Africa (FEDUSA), the National Council of
Trade Unions (NACTU) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSATU). The three largest trade unions are the National Union of Mineworkers
(NUM), the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa, bath COSATU
affiliates, and the Public Servants Association, an affiliate of FEDUSA (South
African Yearbook, 2000/200 1).
South Africa has always had a strong and influential union movement, so much so,
that in many ways it has become a deterrent factor for foreign direct investment. A
section of this chapter will focus on the rise and impact of the union movement. This
historical overview is necessary so that the reader is able to perceive just how deep
the roots of unionisation run in South Africa's history and having thus acknowledged
this, it becomes apparent that unions will continue to play a vital role in both South
Africa's political and economic arena. There is therefore no way that potential
investors can wish them away. The rest of this chapter will concentrate on the South
African Labour Market. The South African Labour Market suffers from impediments
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which not only have become obstacles to economic growth, but which also inhibits
substantial amounts of foreign direct investment. The impediments referred to include
unemployment, education, labour productivity, the AIDS pandemic, the employment
equity legislation, strikes as well as the high South African crime rate. Each of these
impediments will be discussed in turn.
3.2 Historical Background of the South African Trade Unions
In his article, Geoffrey Wood (1998: 76), states that since 1980, union membership
and influence have risen in South Africa, this is in direct contrast to the rest of the
world. This contrast according to Wood can be attributed to the integral role that
legislative reforms in 1979 played in facilitating union organisation and collective
bargaining. Related to this is the fact that within South Africa, the labour relations
evolution markedly differs with that in the richer OECD countries. South Africa
experienced some membership growth in the 1950s and 1960s, almost none in the
1970s, and a massive expansion in the 1980s, which declined to a certain extent in the
1990s. There were only 400, 000 union members in 1955 and 700,000 in 1979, but by
1993 there were 2,800,000. Arguably, two countervailing influences greatly facilitated
the organisation of the workforce. These include the 1979 Wiehahn Reforms, which
created a legal basis for establishing union recognition and collective bargaining for
the majority of workers. The second influence was that of the coordinated
participation of organised labour in the national liberation movement against
apartheid, this served to enhance the ethical appeal of union membership (Wood,
1998: 76).
3.3 The Four Phases of the Evolution of the South African Labour
Movement
South Africa's industrial relations laws have affected the evolution of the labour
movement in four phases. The first phase starts with the 1924 Industrial Conciliation
Act, which provided bargaining rights to unions of white, craft workers. The second
phase was characterised by the 1979 Labour Relations Act and the Industrial
Conciliation Amendments Act, which extended collective bargaining rights to African
unions and enabled them to expand their membership. The 1988 Labour Relations
Amendment Act in the third phase, restricted rights to bargain and strike. The fourth
and final phase was highlighted with the repeal of the Labour Relations Amendment
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Act in 1990 and the enactment of a new Labour Relations Act in 1995 re-established
union bargaining rights (Wood, 1998: 77).
3.3.1 The Formal Exclusion of Africans From Industrial
Relations (1924-1979)
South Africa's industrial relations were first formalized in 1924, with the passage of
the Industrial Conciliation Act. This Act, together with the 1956 Industrial
Conciliation Act, allowed certain groups of employees to form and join unions that
could be registered with the authorities and granted official recognition status. The
collective bargaining rights established by the 1924 Act were available mainly to
white workers in the non-agricultural, private sector. African men were not prohibited
from forming and joining their own unions, but had no right to register them, strike or
participate in the industrial councils. The combination of these laws, a legally
mandated job reservation system for whites in the private sector, the preferential
hiring of Afrikaners in the public sector, and a segregated and unequal education
system helped to create a racially divided labour market. Related to this is the fact that
the white unions and employers on the industrial councils colluded in setting low
wages for African workers. This resulted in the real wages of Africans stagnating
whereas those of whites had, by the early 1970s, risen to five times African levels in
the formal, non-agricultural sector. It should be noted that even though this trend
reversed in the 1980s, average wages for Africans still remained just a third of
average wages for whites in the 1990s (Wood, 1998: 79; Cedras, 1998: 35; Pretorius,
1996: 193).
3.3.2 Liberalization and the Attempts at Containment (1979-
South Africa's system of racist industrial relations was seriously challenged by
massive strikes originating in Durban in early 1973. These strikes occurred at
Coronation Brick and Tile, when workers went on strike following their employers'
refusal to pay a minimum wage of R30 per week. The workers eventually had to be
enticed back to work with wage concessions. Having thus achieved success, the
experience taught African workers that industrial action on a massive scale could
provide them with major improvements in wages and conditions at little risk of
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punislunent by employers. Although the 1973 Bantu Labour Regulation Act, provided
Africans with rights to participate in works committees. it did not provide them with
full collective bargaining rights. Thus, another wave of strikes swept across the
country in 1976 and 1977, when African workers took to the streets to demand the
release of political prisoners and to protest the killing of Soweto students (Wood,
1998: 79; Cedras, 1998: 36; Pretorius, 1996: 193).
In 1977, the government appointed the Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry into Labour
Legislation. The Commission reported back to parliament in 1979, and recommended
that industrial relations be de-radicalised by extending full collective bargaining rights
to Africans and that industrial conflict, be institutionalised by referring disputes to a
new industrial court. Government then passed the 1979 Labour Relations Act, which
afforded Africans the right to join and form registered unions, bargain collectively,
participate in industrial councils, and strike, and by passing the 1979 Industrial
Conciliation Amendments Act, which created an Industrial Court for adjudicating
disputes (Wood, 1998: 80; Cedras, 1998: 36; Pretorius, 1996: 193).
The Wiehahn Reforms failed to dampen industrial unrest, because unions wanted
more than economic rights from the government, they perceived their interests in a
wider context of political repression and economic deprivation stemming from the
apartheid regime. Prior to late 1984, union involvement in the national liberation
movement was uncoordinated and limited to the local level. The labour movement as
a whole did not ally itself with the national liberation movement until August 1984,
when the South African Defence Force invaded the townships to try and restrain a
huge rent boycott. Unions entered into this dispute responding to the request for help
from the Congress of South African Students (COSAS). If unions were planning to
embark on political action, they required a united strategy, this realisation led to the
formation of two new federations. These two federations were divided into those
unions committed to representing a racially inclusive membership founded the
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in 1985. Alternately, unions
committed to representing an exclusively African membership formed another
federation in 1986, which was named the National Council of Trade Unions
(NACTU) in 1987 (Wood, 1998: 83; Cedras, 1998: 37; Pretorius, 1996: 194).
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3.3.3 The Return To Repression (1988-1989)
The apartheid state reasserted its authority through repressive measures due to the
failure of the Wiehahn reforms to reduce strike levels. In June 1986, a state of
emergency was declared; this was followed by sixty-five police attacks on trade
unionists and their premises. These attacks however, did not stop nor prevent the
continuation of massive social and industrial unrest since in 1987 a massive, three
week miners' strike over wages occurred. Also, massive unrest resumed in July 1989,
when the labour movement organised a National Defiance Campaign of
demonstrations, worker summits, stay-away wildcat strikes, and overtime bans to
protest against all unjust and discriminatory laws (Wood, 1998: 84; Cedras, 1998: 38;
Pretorius, 1996: 194).
3.3.4 The Post-Apartheid Transition (1989-1995)
During this period, the South African economy slumped to an all time low,
attributable factors included the following: trade and financial sanctions since 1986,
political and labour unrest since 1984, and a decline in foreign exchange earnings,
caused by a fall in the price of gold i.e. South Africa's main export. Also, due to the
ongoing political and industrial unrest, foreign banks classified South Africa as a
high-risk country as early as 1986 already. Adding to this in the years following 1985,
South Africans were not allowed any foreign funds and, in compliance with the
financial sanctions, many foreign manufacturing firms divested their South African
holdings. To make matters even worse, South African businesses themselves, also lost
confidence in the economy, this led to a decline in investment in plant, machinery,
and equipment, specifically targeting the labour-intensive sectors, which had begun to
be characterised by industrial unrest. Government was forced to counteract this drastic
lack of investments i.e. the need to generate large current account surpluses by
maintaining high interest rates and restraining growth. For every action however,
there is a reaction and the reaction to the above was rising unemployment and
declining real incomes (Wood, 1998: 85; Cedras, 1998: 40; Pretorius, 1996: 195).
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3.4 The Influence of Trade Unions During the Transition
Placing the role of the trade unions in context during the transition period is necessary
since the role that they played cannot be underestimated. Trade unions continue to
hold significant clout with South African workers since they are the ones who workers
regarded as being most likely to see to it that their concerns and needs were seriously
considered during the whole transition to democracy period. Trade unions wield a
considerable amount of influence, illustrated by the fact that they are able to call
strikes and in the process cause significant economic damage to a country while at the
same time instigating political unrest as a consequence of strike action. Not
surprisingly therefore, they inherently hold a substantial amount of political and
economic and therefore, subsequently also, investment risk. The mobilisation capacity
or potential of a host country's labour market therefore, to a certain degree may
influence the level of investment received.
The current role of the South African trade union movement is the result of several
significant events that have occurred during the decline of apartheid in South Africa.
Early in 1990, the largest black trade union federation, the Congress of South African
Trade Unions (COSATU), was viewed as too "left-leaning" because of its connection
to the African National Congress. This period was also characterised by the fact that
the black trade union movement was not represented in the South African
government, labour legislation at the time was quite restrictive, violent strikes were
the predominant method available for achieving collective bargaining gains and no
cooperation existed among trade union federations (Barret, 1996: 37; Cedras, 1998:
14).
Change was initiated when Nelson Mandela became president in 1994, followed by
the passing of a comprehensive and progressive new law in the following year,
concerning labour and which stemmed from a tripartite consensus. Another contrast
between the old South Africa and the new South Africa is the allowance of foreign
help. An example of this is that during the apartheid era, the AFL-CIO program that
supported black trade unions was not allowed in the country. Yet, by 1995, an AFL-
CIO office had been established in Johannesburg which now directly supports and
assists South African unions (Barret, 1996: 38; Cedras, 1998: 14).
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The trade urnons played a significant role in South Africa's transition towards
democracy. During the 1990-95 period, the trade unions were involved in numerous
political activities i.e. petitioning the freedom of political prisoners, developing a
mechanism to create a new constitution, assisting in the drafting of the new
constitution, educating South Africans about government processes and voting
procedures, aiding in plans for the 1994 election and assisting in the first all inclusive
election, conducting the election of the African National Congress party, persuading
the United States and other countries to lift the international trade ban as well as
convincing foreign private investors to increase their investments in South Africa
together with encouraging companies within South Africa to invest more in private
development activities (Barret, 1996: 39; Cedras, 1998: 15).
3.5 The Labour Relations Act
The 1995 Labour Relations Act is one of the world's most progressive pieces of
labour legislation in terms of its protection for striking workers, organisational rights
granted to unions as well as the promotion of centralised bargaining. The Labour
Relations Act (LRA), 1995 (Act 66 of 1995), came into effect on 11 November 1996,
and bears the indelible stamp of the labour movement's influence. It retains the right
to bargain and strike created by the Wiehahn legislation and provides new rights to
participate in decision-making through workplace forums. Wood argues that at the
very least, it makes no provision for deregulating and individualising the employment
relationship in a manner that might reflect business rather than union interests (Barret,
1996, Wood, 1998, Pretorius, 1996: 209).
To conclude this section of the chapter, it has been noted that trade unions were the
dominant force during the downfall of apartheid, and they maintain a powerful
presence in the new South Africa. Also as the need for political activism of the past
diminishes, there has been talk among the unions of returning to the basics of trade
unionism i.e. collective bargaining, grievance handling, occupational safety, employee
rights, and community involvement. Thus even though strikes do occur, the growing
use and increased acceptability of the mediation-arbitration service during the past
few years, by both labour and management, shows clear and positive evidence that
such processes can work in South Africa. To their credit it should also be noted that
the Congress of South African Trade Unions has maintained its independence from
both the government and the African National Congress. It is however able to
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influence government policies through former trade union officials who now hold
positions in government (Barret, 1996: 41; Satgar, 1996: 102; Satgar, 2000: 74).
3.6 The South African Labour Market
Aside from investment, the economic growth within the country is dependent on a
variety of factors, the backbone of which is the South African labour market.
Having had an in-depth discussion about the integral and instrumental role played by
the trade unions in both South Africa's past and present, the second part of this chapter
will focus on the South African Labour Market as well as the challenges it faces.
Challenges, which impede the flow of foreign direct investment into the country and
challenges, which if not adequately addressed, have the potential to lead to the
continued economic and social decline of the country.
3.6.1 Understanding The Concept "Labour Market"
The "labour market" refers to the institutions that determine how labour power is
bought and sold i.e. how many jobs there are, the wage rate, hours worked, and
conditions of employment. Therefore, the labour market has a profound impact on the
economic welfare and social well being of all South Africans. The "labour market"
differs from both the product and financial market in three specific ways.
First, labour can contest the conditions under which it is exchanged. Employers
generally purchase a worker's labour time and not the realised value of what that
labour produces. Therefore, the labour market and the labour process are inherently
political and subject to conflict. Second, labour is both a producer and consumer of
goods. Labour is therefore essential in discussions around appropriate macro-
economic policies. With this in mind, labour market outcomes may influence
aggregate demand for goods and services and impact on the overall health of the
economy (Naidoo, 1998: 38; Baskin, 1996).
Third, the labour market is in fact a number of quite separate market segments.
Region, skill level, occupation, the nature of the work, race and gender, segment
markets. This can be illustrated by the fact that the professional worker is skilled and
in relatively short supply in South Africa, and subsequently, has greater bargaining
power. On the other side of the spectrum, the unskilled worker has little bargaining
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power due to the surplus of workers and shortage of jobs (Naidoo, 1998: 38; Baskin,
1996).
The South African labour market is divided into three broad segments i.e. the primary
labour market, the secondary labour market, and the informal/unpaid labour market
(Naidoo, 1998: 41; Baskin, 1996).
The primary labour market refers to white-collar professionals, management, some
service providers, and higher skilled public service employees. The secondary labour
market refers to production workers, low paid service workers, and agricultural
labour. The informal/unpaid labour market is comprised of domestic workers,
informal sector employees, household labourers, and informal, subsistence
agricultural labour. Movement from one segmented market to another is extremely
difficult. Also, workers in secondary and informal/unpaid segments face greater risk,
lower pay, less job security and often a lower level of bargaining power than do
workers in the primary segments (Naidoo, 1998:41; Baskin, 1996).
3.6.2 Labour Market Flexibility
It has been stated that the South African labour market is too "rigid". This "rigidity"
has also been blamed for bringing about job loss and negative job growth. As a result,
businesses demand greater labour market flexibility. The term "labour market
flexibility" is not always clear. Itmay have a positive connotation i.e. referring to the
ability of workers to move up job grades, but more often than not, it refers to eroding
labour standards and subtle forms of union bashing (Naidoo, 1998: 45; Baskin, 1996;
Satgar, 2000: 53).
The three main types of flexibility can be categorised into work process flexibility,
wage flexibility and numerical flexibility (Naidoo, 1998: 45; Baskin, 1996; Satgar,
2000: 53).
Work process flexibility refers to the way in which production and grading is
organised. For employers, it refers to the ease with which they can shift workers
between activities; alter hours of work and work practices. It includes such aspects as
multi-skilling, job-rotation and different forms of teamwork. Reports show that this is
the only form of flexibility that is rare in South Africa (Naidoo, 1998: 45; Baskin,
1996; Satgar, 2000: 53).
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Wage flexibility refers to the extent that wage rates will change as employers' demand
for new workers changes. It also refers to shifting from a uniform pay system based
on the time that workers spend at work to a system where wages are linked to
performance e.g. productivity bonuses (Naidoo, 1998: 45; Baskin, 1996; Satgar, 2000:
53).
Numerical flexibility refers to the ease with which employers can hire workers when
needed and fire them when they are not needed. An example of this includes the use
of casual or seasonal workers. In this case, workers are brought into production when
needed and released again, rather than being continuously employed (Naidoo, 1998:
45; Baskin, 1996; Satgar, 2000: 53).
3.7 Structural Challenges in the South African Labour Market
At the start of this chapter, mention was made about the challenges that South Africa
faces in terms of attracting foreign investment, since not meeting these challenges has
actually caused the impediment of investment and in some instances has even led to
foreign divestiture. The challenges which South Africa faces include the following:
unemployment, the current lack of formal education which prevents the development
of manpower and expansion of the labour pool, the poor levels of labour productivity
experienced by the economy, wage levels, government intervention - another term for
affirmative action, the AIDS pandemic as well as mass action in the form of strikes
and the impact it has on the economy. This part of the chapter will now address each
of these challenges in turn.
3.7.1 The Unemployment Challenge For Labour
Unemployment remains South Africa's most formidable economic challenge,
arguably, second only to the even more formidable AIDS pandemic. The total number
of people who are willing and able to work is called the economically active
population. In 1993, the Department of Labour estimated the economically active
population of South Africa to be in the region of 13,4 million (Grosset, 1998: 126).
According to the October Household Survey of 1997, about 22% of South Africa's
economically active population are unemployed. The majority of the unemployed are
black men and women under the age of 35 years (South African Yearbook,
2000/2001). In a study conducted by the National Labour and Economic Development
Institute (NALEDI), slightly higher figures are mentioned. According to them, about
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4,5 million people, representing 37,6% of an economically active population of 12,1
million, were unemployed in 1997. This shows a significant increase from the 1995
level of 29,2% (Naidoo, 1998: 39). Research also shows that unemployed people tend
to remain unemployed for a long time, indicating the structural nature of
unemployment. (Naidoo, 1998: 39; Bhorat, 1996: 143-146; Mohr, 1998:89).
The concept of unemployment can be divided into five categories i.e. frictional
unemployment, cyclical unemployment, structural unemployment, seasonal
unemployment and classical unemployment. Structural and, more recently, cyclical
unemployment, mainly afflict South Africa (Grosset, 1998: 127; Mohr, 1998: 80-89).
Cyclical unemployment refers to a fluctuating level of unemployment and has been a
fairly recent phenomenon in the South African economy. Studies indicate that from
the start of the recession in 1989 to the first quarter of 1993, some 350 000 jobs were
lost in the formal sector and about 30 000 were lost in the informal sector. Also
contributing to South Africa's unemployment rate is the fact that between 1992 and
1993, the top 100 South African companies decreased employment by approximately
220000 (12,7%) jobs i.e. from 1,94 million to 1,72 million (Grosset, 1998: 127).
Structural unemployment occurs when there is a mismatch in job opportunities and
skills. An illustration of this is when even though there might be jobs available in the
economy, there might only be workers available who lack the necessary skills to
perform the work. These workers will therefore remain unemployed until such time as
they upgrade their skills. This is possibly the major contributor to South Africa's
unemployment crisis stemming from apartheid's legacy of poor education and poor
employment. In the South African economy there is unemployment since there is an
oversupply of unskilled workers for which there is a lower demand and an
undersupply of skilled workers, for which a higher demand exists (Grosset, 1998:
127; Mohr, 1998: 80-89).
According to Statistics South Africa's Household Survey of October 1999, using the
strict definition, the unemployment rate was 23.3%. Reflecting a 4,0% increase i.e.
from 19,3% in 1996. Whereas using the expanded definition, the unemployment rate
was 36,2%. This reflects a 3,2% point increase over the 1996 figure of 33,0%
(Statistics South Africa, October Household Survey, 1999).
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The appropriateness of the strict definition is debatable, where unemployment is of a
deeply structural nature, as is the case in South Africa. There is a high incidence of
discouraged job seekers with 43% of unemployed persons having searched for formal
sector jobs for at least three years. Official employment data in South Africa is subject
to considerable debate, and currently under review. Many of the official surveys
providing figures for the 1990s cannot be compared due to constant changes in
definitions (Statistics South Africa, October Household Survey, 1999).
A sufficient labour pool with access to equal education opportunities and with the
necessary skills and training may to some degree alleviate the problem of structural
unemployment. It should also be noted that South Africa, like most other developing
countries, has no accurate register of unemployment, therefore it seems that official
statistics reflecting the unemployment rate is to some degree, somewhat inadequate.
This is problematic in that there may be thousands more unemployed than estimated
in surveys. This becomes even more of a problem since government would be unable
to adequately provide the necessary and required facilities to fully accommodate those
in need. Yet the fact that South Africa does indeed have a very large unemployment
rate cannot be disputed.
3.7.2 The Challenge of Education and Training For Labour
Arguably, the enormous lack of education and training amongst the South African
black majority can be regarded as the most detrimental impact of the apartheid
regime. Formal education, which is regarded as the most basic level of education, has
also been the most inadequate. Illustrating this is the fact that a decade ago, only 44%
of the population had an education higher than a standard four certificate. Fifty-six
percent were thus considered to be functionally illiterate and 35% of the economically
active population were found to be illiterate, while only 15,8 % of the population had
a school-leaving certificate. It is also further estimated that approximately 2,5 million
people between the ages of 20 and 64 have no schooling at all (Grosset, 1998: 133;
Macfarlane, 2002: 6).
As far as training goes, studies show that in most highly developed industrialised
countries there is a ratio of two skilled workers for every unskilled worker. However,
in South Africa, there are five unskilled workers per skilled worker (Grosset, 1998:
133; Macfarlane, 2002: 6).
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Training is extremely expensive, in 1994 alone, R70 million was spent to train 46 210
unemployed people for the formal sector and 65 044 for the informal sector (of whom
only 6 564 and 14 168 respectively, received jobs). This fact again shows the
importance and crucial necessity of foreign direct investment, which to a certain
degree also necessarily invests in training in the host country. Another concern, which
relates to the above, is the lack of professionals with degrees and diplomas being
generated by tertiary institutions, since a successful economy depends largely on the
creation of trained professionals and trained artisans (Grosset, 1998: 133; Macfarlane,
2002: 6).
3.7.3 The Challenge of Labour Productivity
One argument for the current lack of foreign direct investment, which South Africa
receives, is blamed on the low productivity rates of the South African labour market.
Strikes have become a feature in the South African economy and they necessarily
mean lower productivity due to a substantial loss of working hours. It has therefore
been argued that an increase in productivity necessarily implies an increase in the size
of the South African economy and it would therefore also lead to a reduction in
unemployment. Research shows however, that South Africa does in fact have rising
labour productivity, even though employment is still on the decline (Naidoo, 1998:
60). In order to fully comprehend the impact which productivity has on the economy,
one needs to conceptualise the term first.
Grosset (1998: 135) defines productivity as being the production of more with the
same amount of human effort. Labour productivity is therefore seen as the efficiency
with which output is produced by resources utilised (Grosset, 1998: 135). It may also
be defined as being the amount of output produced, on average, in one hour of work
or by one employee over a particular period of time (Naidoo, 1998: 60). It is
important to note that productivity cannot simply be considered in isolation. It is both
a product of, and impacts on a variety of contributing factors i.e. technology used,
macro-economic policies, investment, trade, working hours, etc.
With regard to technology, logic would dictate that the introduction of the use of a
piece of machinery, would make the work of some workers redundant, since the
machine would be able to work faster and produce more and therefore lead to higher
levels of unemployment. Although true to a certain degree, the opposite is also
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applicable, since the enhancement of technology also means that a need for more
skilled and educated people who are able to operate the machinery will also occur and
will therefore subsequently create more employment. A link therefore is formed
between the productivity of the machinery, which in turn is dependent on the
productivity of the person operating it. This links up with the above discussed
challenge concerning education and training i.e. the educational and technical
qualifications of an industrialised, highly productive labour force would then
necessarily be higher than those of a low productivity agrarian-based labour force
(Grosset, 1998: 136).
For a more comprehensive understanding of the impact which productivity has on
South Africa's global standing regarding foreign direct investment, one needs to
realise that the onslaught of globalisation meant an increase in foreign trade and
massive foreign direct investment (FDI) in countries which ultimately benefit
transnational corporations (TNCs) through reduced costs. Not surprisingly therefore,
countries that offer access to raw materials and cheap labour have been the largest
recipients of FDI from TNCs. At present however, South Africa is not in the running
for receiving substantial amounts of FDI from TNCs. Due to the fact the even though
it has experienced a growth in hourly compensation, it has shown no similar increase
in productivity, even though productivity is on the rise (Grosset, 1998: 138; Mohr,
1998: 165).
A contributory factor, is the fact that labour cost per unit manufactured, both in rand
and dollar terms has increased to a large extent. This has an adverse effect on South
Africa's competitiveness in comparison with other developing countries. Reason being
that South Africa's labour costs are as high in terms of dollars as some of the
developed countries. Grosset (1998: 138) cites an example of this in terms of the
average wage in the manufacturing sector. Since in South Africa the average wage in
this particular sector is Rl 500 per month, whereas in Vietnam and Indonesia it is
RII0 and R740 respectively. Another debilitating factor is the fact that South Africa
is unable to offer the same level of efficiency as that of the more developed countries
who offer similar high wages. Therefore since South Africa is too expensive by the
standards of many other countries, it becomes unattractive as a potential site for
foreign investment (Grosset, 1998: 138; Mohr, 1998: 165).
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It becomes apparent that productivity policies and strategies pose a substantial
challenge to labour. Since, on the one side of the coin, an increase in productivity
necessarily means an increase in economic resources in South Africa coupled with a
provision of a social wage, along with a rise in the standard of living and in the same
vein also leading to the eventual alleviation of poverty. Realistically though, it should
be noted that productivity simply and solely cannot achieve all of the above on its
own. Even though it may produce the necessary resources for both social and
economic development, change in both the institutional and distributive structures of
the economy are a prerequisite if the set goals are to be achieved. On the flip side of
the coin, within the context of a present day, capitalist economy, an increase in
productivity may in fact lead to jobless growth combined with an unequal distribution
in national income. This would not bode well for South Africa's social stability since
it already struggles to come to terms with its already high and increasing
unemployment as well as having one of the most unequal distributions of income in
the world (Naidoo, 1998: 62; Mohr, 1998: 166).
3.7.4 The Challenge of the AIDS Pandemic For South African Labour
Research shows that at the end of 1999,33.6 million people in the world were living
with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), the virus that causes Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). Related to this is that in 1999, alone, 5.6
million people, 44% of whom were women, and 3,6% of whom were children under
the age of 15, were infected with HIV. Those who can least afford it; have been the
most targeted by this non-discriminatory virus. Since it is estimated that 95% of those
infected with HIV/AIDS live in the developing world, relatedly, of this 95%,
approximately 70% live in Africa. This is not so surprising when one considers that
the twenty-one countries with the highest HIV rates in the world are in sub-Saharan
Africa. With this in mind it has been estimated that by the year 2020, close to 37,1%
of deaths in the developing world will be due to HIV/AIDS (Peters 2000/01: 441 and
Grosset, 1998: 143; Boseley, 2002: 13). These facts necessarily raise the question as
to why there is such a high prevalence of the disease in sub-Saharan Africa?
The following factors have been identified as being the contributory factors
explaining the prevalence of the disease i.e. migrant labour, population movement,
gender inequality, lack of knowledge and poverty and inequality (Peters, 2000/01:
444).
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Migrant labour, since when men take up migrant labour, they live apart from their
wives for months at a time. Thus, during long separations from their wives, men who
engage in extramarital affairs, put themselves and their wives at risk of contracting
HIV. Population movement is another contributing factor. HIV/AIDS rates are higher
in border towns where people tend to be on the move and may be tempted to engage
in unprotected sex. Related to this is the fact that when economic and infrastructural
development e.g. roads, leads to the movement of people, HIV rates tend to rise
(Peters, 2000/01: 444).
Due to gender inequality, HIV/AIDS spreads at a faster rate in situations where
women are not empowered to demand that their partners wear condoms or remain
monogamous. This is the case in most developing countries. Lack of knowledge about
HIV/AIDS is a fourth factor increasing the spread of the disease. If people are not
educated about HIV/AIDS, they may not know how to protect themselves against its
spread. Rumours and myths cloud many people's understanding of HIV/AIDS and
therefore also their ability to protect themselves against its spread, related to this is
also the fact that myth and cultural attitudes portray the condom as a negative entity
(Peters, 2000/01: 444).
Poverty and inequality is the fifth and final factor. Where poverty has led to the rapid
spread of HIV/AIDS in the developing world, the spread of HIV/AIDS will in turn
lead to increases in poverty. HIV/AIDS tends to affect those who are economically
active in society i.e. the healthy, young sexually active men and women who are the
main support of their households (Peters, 2000/01: 444).
Young people with HIV/AIDS also contribute to their respective economies. Their
illness is likely to lead to increased absenteeism in the workplace, which will in turn
lead to decreases in productivity, which will affect employers as well as the economy
negatively. This will especially be the case when an economy is growing relatively
quickly and has a demand for skilled labour. HIV/AIDS also threatens human
development. Life expectancies in many countries have decreased due to HIV/AIDS,
while simultaneously; child mortality and the number of AIDS orphans have
increased (Grosset, 1998: 143, Peters, 2000/01: 445). The impact ofHIV/AIDS on the
South African economy can also not be ignored.
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South Africa has one of the fastest growing HIVepidemics in the world. Since 1990,
the Department of Health has undertaken a series of annual, unlinked, anonymous
HIV surveys amongst women attending antenatal clinics of the Public Health Services
in South Africa (Department of Health of the Republic of South Africa, 1999).
Figure 1:_HIV Prevalence trends in South Africa 1990-1999
25 22J3 22.4
19(1) (91)1 1991 19'3 1994 199'5 1996 19:91 :1'998 1999
t'EAR
(Department of Health of the Republic of South Africa, 1999)
Refer to figure: 1 above. The above figure is a diagrammatical representation of the
dramatic increase of HIV / AIDS in South Africa from 1990 to 1999, illustrating the
increase therefore within a nine year period. Estimates of the national HIV prevalence
for the years 1990 to 1998 show a steady increase from 0.7% in 1990 to 22.8% in
1998. This indicates an increase of more than 30 times from the beginning of the
epidemic. The 1999 estimate (22.4%) suggests that the overall HIV prevalence rates
have not increased, but there may be a slight change in the epidemiological trends of
the HIVepidemic in South Africa (Department of Health of the Republic of South
Africa, 1999).
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W. E.I N. Free Kwazulu/l Mpumu- Northern Gauteng NorthCape Cape' Cape State Natal langa Province West
3.1 8.1 6.5 17.5
19.6 26.9 22.6
15.9 9.9 22.8 32.5 30.0
7.1 18.0 10.1 27.9 32.5 27.3
Figures given as percentage estimated HIV infection (95% Cl).
Taking into consideration that the survey was limited to women of childbearing age,
Table 1: Rate of Percentage Increase Within Provinces
estimates reflect only 15-49 year-aids
. (Department of Health of the Republic of South Africa, 1999)
Levels of HIV infection vary across different geographic regions in South Africa as
the above table shows. Of the nine provinces, KwazululNatal continues to be the
province with the highest prevalence, which showed an increase from 19.90% in 1996
to 32.5% in 1998, but no further increase in 1999. In contrast, the Western Cape,
whilst remaining the province with the lowest level of infection, shows a 36.5% rate
of increase from 5.2% in 1998 to 7.1% in 1999 (Department of Health of the Republic
of South Africa). Refer to table: 1 above.
The economic impact of the pandemic is exacerbated by refusing benefits to people
with HIV, since this automatically shifts the burden for their care onto the
government. This will impact negatively on the economy, as taxes will have to be
raised to support public systems of care (Grosset, 1998: 176). The potentially
devastating effects that HIV1AIDS has on national economies will undoubtedly be
met by increased demands on public health budgets. An illustration of this fact is
found in that 39% of beds in hospitals in Nairobi, Kenya, and 70% in Bujumbura,
Burundi, are occupied by those who are HIV positive (Peters, 2000101: 445).
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3.7.5 The Challenge of Affirmative Action For Labour
Mention the concept of "affirmative action" and what springs to the minds of a large
number of South Africans is that translated, it actually means, "reverse
apartheid" (Hugo, 1996: 217). Unpacking this translation however simply means that
certain privileges are conferred on certain population groups by virtue of race and
colour. In theory, the main beneficiaries should be all those previously disadvantaged
and discriminated against due to the above-mentioned traits i.e. the black majority.
Women and the disabled are also included in this group; yet, it is a known fact that by
far, the largest beneficiaries of any form of benefits are blacks (Grosset, 1998: 153).
The Employment Equity Act of 1998 also relates to affirmative action. It signalled the
beginning of the final phase of transformation in the job market, which began with the
implementation of the Labour Relations Act of 1995. It aims to achieve representivity
in employment and correct past discriminatory employment practices. The Act
compels employers to adopt employment policies and practices which do not unfairly
discriminate on the basis of race, sex, disability, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or
social origin, sexual orientation, opinion, culture, language, religion or belief (South
African Yearbook, 2000/01). It is a well-known fact that South Africa has one of the
most liberal and progressive constitutions; some may even argue that it is to our own
detriment, doing more harm than good in certain aspects. Affirmative action is
enshrined in the Constitution under Act 108 of 1996. Section 9(2) states:
Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and
freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other
measures designed to protect or advance persons or categories of
persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken (The
South African Constitution, Act 108, Section 9(2).
Conceptualising the term "affirmative action" in a nutshell therefore means a way in
which to overcome the effects of past discrimination with regards to race and gender.
It thus becomes a policy that applies a different set of standards and rules to
individuals of different population groups. More specifically, it translates into being a
policy of national reconstruction and transformation. Its eventual aim therefore, being
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the elimination of all inequalities stemming from past discrimination (Grosset, 1998:
153).
Pierre Hugo (1996: 216) argues that even though the drive behind affirmative action
emanates from an awareness of reversing the injustices of apartheid, it is also in fact a
mechanism promoted by policy makers. The reason for this being the recognition that
the new black constituencies need to be pacified in order to contain their potentially
volatile reaction, should their political demands for a better life not be addressed
(Hugo, 1996: 216).
Although figures have increased, an illustration of the slow pace of change is that in
1993 alone approximately only 3% of middle-management positions were held by
non-whites (meaning Africans, Coloureds and Indians), while the figure for those in
top management was under one percent. As a means of increasing the pace of change,
an organisation by the name of the Black Management Forum (BMF), established in
1993 and claiming to be the legitimate voice of black managers, drew up a policy
document (Hugo, 1996: 217).
The aim of this document is to transform South African business organisations from
discriminatory to ones that reflect the demographic composition and values of South
African society as a whole. The way, in which they sought to ensure this, was by
means of a quota system. They used the year 2000 as a target by which time all South
African companies were expected to have the following percentages of blacks in their
employ: 80% of all trainees; 70% of all supervisors; 50% of junior managers; 40% of
middle managers; 30% of senior managers; 20% of executive directors and 30% of
non-executive directors (Hugo, 1996: 217). These recommendations have now for the
most part, become standard operating procedure in most large South African
companies.
For every action however, there is a reaction. Although this policy has its heart in a
morally correct place by aiming to correct the imbalance in terms of numbers, it
creates new problems. Problems that may affect both the employee and the employer.
Since blacks may feel entitled to jobs and quotas, it leads to competition on an
unequal basis; it may lead to a reduction in company standards due to firms being
forced to employ a set number of affirmative action candidates; blacks may be used as
tokens i.e. they may be employed merely to show society that blacks are being
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employed by the organisation; quotas can also be seen as an expense similar to
welfare, not as an investment, since workers lacking skills are in overpaid jobs; this
also relates to the fact that quotas can have a stigmatising effect on workers who have
the skill to do the job properly (Grosset, 1998: 157).
From the above discussion one may conclude that the implementation of affirmative
action and the quota system may serve as yet another impediment to foreign
investment and as such it poses a certain amount of risk to the potential investor as
well. Since foreign companies are under pressure to comply with the quota system, at
times having to employ incompetent workers, they exercise their freedom of choice
and choose not to invest. Reason being that even though they may comply with
legislation, they lose out in the end since lack of education means lack of knowledge
leading to lower productivity and therefore inevitably also to lower profits. The quota
system can therefore definitely be regarded as being a disincentive for investment.
3.7.6 The Impact of Mass Action and Demonstrations on Investment
Perception
The Labour Relations Act of 1995 entrenches the right to strike, encourages sectoral
and enterprise bargaining and also clarifies the law on unfair dismissals and
information disclosure. It also introduced workplace forums and new mechanisms for
dispute resolution (The South African Yearbook, 2000101). All employees now have a
statutory right to strike, once mediation has failed or a 30-day "cooling off" period has
elapsed, and as long as 48-hours written notice has been given. However, strikes are
illegal if prescribed by the terms of a collective agreement or if caused by a dispute
over a contract interpretation or dismissal. Similarly, strikes by essential service
workers are unlawful, as are strikes by maintenance workers where serious damage
would follow from the withdrawal of their services e.g. ventilation and drainage in a
mine, etc. (Wood, 1998: 90).
The fact that strikes and mass protest have an adverse impact on the economy, goes
without saying and the prevalence of strikes also add to the negative investment
perception of the country. Research shows that the cumulative number of man-days
lost due to strike action rose from 2.3 million in 1998 to 3.1 million in 1999. Although
there was a significant increase in 1999 from 1998, it is still below the levels
experienced during the late eighties and early nineties in the period before the first
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democratic election. The majority of strike action in 1999 was high profile in nature,
wage-related, and marked by heightened levels of emotion. The protracted wage
dispute in the public sector involving the South African Democratic Teachers Union,
the national Department of Education, the Health and Allied Workers' Union and the
Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union, which culminated in national demonstrations
and strikes in July and August 1999, accounted for 60,9% of the total number of man-
days lost (The South African Yearbook, 2000/01; Macun, 2000: 99).
The transport sector accounted for 13.1% of the total largely as a result of the national
wage strike that occurred in April of that same year, involving both the SA Bus
Employers' Association and Transport and General Workers' Union. Wage strikes
involving the South Post Office, Telkom and Communication Workers Union in
August and September accounted for 9.3% of the total. The mining sector and the
National Union of Miners (NUM) followed at 7% as a result of wage strikes at
various gold and coalmines and a dispute at Oryx Gold-mine over the issue of
retrenchment. The retail sector accounted for 2.9% of the total (The South African
Yearbook, 2000/01; Macun, 2000: 99).
The major strike trigger was wages, which accounted for 97,2% of the total number of
man-days lost (or 80% of the number of strikes), followed by retrenchment (1,9%),
dismissal or discipline (0.6%) and grievance (0.2%). During 1999, 28% of strikes
exceeded 10 days, compared with a figure of 42.1% in 1998. There was also a
decrease in the number of strikes involving 1000 or more workers (46%) compared
with 1998(65.8%) (The South African Yearbook, 2000/01). Even though and it has to
be noted, that there has been a significant decline in the number of strikes or mass
demonstrations occurring, as well as a decline in the number of participants, the
impact that they do have and the perception that they do create, should not be
underestimated. The fact that workers do have a right to strike and demonstrate,
shows that South Africa does have a working democracy in place, yet the frequency
with which they occur could eventually lead to the country's economic detriment. This
is due to the impact that frequency of strikes has on a country's potential as a location
for possible investment. Investment perception is undoubtedly influenced by labour
mass action, since minimal risk is what most investors are after.
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3.7.7 The Challenge of South Africa's High Crime Ratefor FDI
At a global level, South Africa has the highest rate of violent crime. In 1999, a third of
all crimes recorded by the police were violent. In the United States, considered to be a
relatively violent society, 15% of recorded crimes were violent, while in Britain; the
figure was only 6%. South Africa's international image has also been tarnished by
crimes. The country has been rated by some international organisations as one of the
most unsafe places to live in. Partly due to the lack of safety, some international
investors are hesitating to invest their money in this country, which is full of natural
resources. Crimes also add fuel to the spreading brain drain. An estimated 25, 000
professionals are now leaving South Africa annually in order to find better-paying
jobs and enjoy a peaceful life free from crime. Research shows that the cost to South
Africa with regards to the brain drain amounts to approximately 2.5 billion rand a year
(Xinhua News Agency, 200 1:1).
South Africa's high crime rate is a problem not only for South Africans, but also for
potential investors as well as having to deal with a host country that is plagued by
crime, increases their investment risk that much more. The more affluent and higher
educated South Africans seek greener pastures, so to speak, having become
despondent with the current state of affairs and seeing no light at the end of a very
dark tunnel. Arguably, they are the fortunate ones; they move away because they can,
it is the ones who stay who suffer the most. Firstly the majority of them have very
little or no education therefore not being very marketable on the labour market.
Secondly, they are also the ones who suffer the most due to lack of investment, since
most times, foreign investment accompanies job creation. Therefore a high crime rate
has a negative impact on both the citizens of a country and the potential investors who
wish to invest in a particular country.
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The above is a diagrammatical representation illustrating the increase in the crime rate
in South Africa from 1994 -to 2000. This period is significant in that it also
encapsulates the years in which South African elections took place i.e. 1994 and 1999
and the years immediately after the elections i.e.1995 and 2000. Furthermore it
indicates that measured on a per capita basis (per 100 000 of the population) for the
periods January to May every year from 1994 onwards, crime levels were at their
lowest in 1997 and at their highest in 2000 (refer to figure: 3). From January to May
2000, some 2 300 crimes were recorded for every 100 000 people living in South
Africa. The crimes included below cover the twenty most serious and prevalent
crimes recorded by the police. They account for over 99% of the volume of all serious
crime recorded by the police (Nedbank ISS Crime Index, 2000).
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Figure 3:
Number of violent crimes recorded per 100 000 of the population,
January to May 1994 - 2000
(Source: SAPS Crime Information Analysis Centre (CIAC)
The above diagrammatical representation indicates that measured on a per capita
basis, the greatest increase in recorded crime since 1994 occurred between 1998-99
(6.5%), followed by 1999-2000 (5.2%). The first five months of 2000 show the
highest per capita level of violent crime: murder; attempted murder; rape; and all
forms of robbery and assault, for the same five months period from 1994 onwards
(refer to figure: 3). In the period from January to May 2000, just fewer than 755
violent crimes were recorded per 100 000 of the population, compared to 697 per 100
000 in the same period in 1999 (Nedbank ISS Crime Index, 2000).
Reducing crime is one of the leading challenges of South Africa's democratic
government. In 1999, the government implemented policy and developed a strategy to
enhance national crime combating capabilities. While this strategy has had some
success in impacting on organised crime, the statistics suggest that the initiatives are
still to have an impact on crime reduction in general. Crime remains a priority
concern, which continues to breed insecurity and impede investor confidence.
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3.8 Conclusion
This chapter started with a discussion of the role of and impact of trade unions in
South Africa. Itwas found that their past role in the transition to democracy cannot be
underestimated and more importantly, neither should their future role in the country
with regards to the labour market be underestimated either. Aside from investment,
the economic growth within the country is dependent on a variety of factors, the
backbone of which is the South African labour market. As the above discussion
indicated, South Africa continues to face the challenges of unemployment and job
creation, education and training, levels of productivity and arguably, the most
pressing problems continue to be that of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the impact it
will have on the South African labour force as well as South Africa's record high
crime rates. Should a serious address of the above-mentioned challenges not occur,
South Africa will continue to lag behind in foreign investment and only continue to
have a shaky hold over the meagre investments it now receives.
The aim of this study is too investigate reasons why South Africa is not receiving
substantial amounts of foreign investment and to find ways in which the country
might improve on its current investor perception. This is what the preceding
discussion attempted to answer, by highlighting the current problematic points
currently present within the South African labour market. Having highlighted the
problematic areas also then serves as a point of departure for finding solutions to the
current state of affairs. The next part of this paper will be a chapter focussing on
Nigeria. Specifically Nigeria as being one of the African countries that continue to
receive substantial amounts of foreign direct investment, much more than South
Africa, despite the fact that it seemingly poses more of a risk than South Africa. The
next chapter will discuss aspects of the Nigerian political and economic sectors, in
relation to that of South Africa. Initially however, focus will first be solely on that of
Nigeria.
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Foreign Direct Investment And Political Risks In Soutb Africa and
Nigeria: A Comparative Analysis
Chapter Four: The Nigerian Labour Market and its Impact on Foreign
Investment in Comparison to South Africa
4.1 Introduction
The relationship between South Africa and Nigeria is definitely not an arbitrary one.
Nigeria's change from a military dictatorship to a democracy in 1999 resulted in South
Africa's gaining an ally in Africa. Regarded as two of Africa's largest economic
power- houses, vibrant political and economic relations between the two countries are
essential. The link between the two countries has further been strengthened by the role
the respective heads of state have undertaken in promoting Africa's latest economic
plan i.e. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), since President
Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, have taken it upon
themselves to be the main spoke persons for the plan. These are the more recent
relations between the two countries, they do however, share past relations. Illustrated
by South Africa's support for Nigeria's transition to democracy as well as Obasanjo's
personal ties to South African leaders. A relationship which stems from the mid-1980s
when Obasanjo co-chaired the Commonwealth Eminent Person's Group in pursuit of a
negotiated transition from apartheid to majority rule. Also after his release from
prison, after having been detained for political reasons, Obasanjo's first stop while on
tour was South Africa, to brief leaders on developments in Nigeria (Kornegay,
1999/2000: 65).
Furthermore, South Africa's economic relations with Nigeria are stronger and better
established than its relations with other West African countries. A bi-national
commission was set up in 1999 to govern relations between the two countries. Also, a
legal framework, the Investment Protection Agreement (lPA), has been put in place to
facilitate investment between the two countries. It is also probably not surprising then
that there is a degree of convergence in the foreign economic strategies that have been
adopted by the administrations of the government of the two countries. The policy
directives of both governments have stressed the necessity of attracting foreign
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investment, combating corruption, promoting accountable governance and good
governance practices, privatizing state and public enterprises, and strengthening the
capacity oflaw enforcement agencies (Voges, 2001/ 2002: 329).
The aim of this chapter is to provide a brief but thorough illustration of the current
situation in Nigeria pertaining to the Nigerian labour market in relation to and
comparison with the labour market in South Africa. Focusing on the labour market
and all of the factors that pertain to it is essential in this chapter as it was in the last.
Placing the labour market in context helps one to better understand the level of or in
some instances, the lack of foreign direct investment in the country as well as the
level of political risk. This is due to the fact that a perceived defective labour market
necessarily means an increase in risk for potential investors.
4.2 Historical Background of Nigeria
The country of Nigeria came into existence III 1914, when two British colonial
protectorates were amalgamated into one territorial unit. This act brought together
hundreds of distinct ethnic and political groups. The country gained its independence
in 1960. Since then it has been ruled primarily by military dictatorship. The most
repressive regime was the one of General Sani Abacha (1993-1998). With Abacha's
death in 1998, General Abdusalami Abubakar took control for a short period and
allowed elections to proceed. Although it was acknowledged that there had been
widespread fraud during the elections, the pressure to transition Nigeria to so-called
democratic rule was so great, that the elections' result were certified by international
observers. On May 29, 1999, former General Olusegun Obasanjo became Nigeria's
first civilian president since 1993 (Ikein, 1998: 35; Osaghae, 1998: 50).
Nigeria is an important country in West Africa because it accounts for 47% of the
region's population and 43% of regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Democratic
Nigeria is West Africa's hope for economic and political recovery, but the country's
unpredictable and oscillating internal politics continue to be an impediment not only
to itself but also to the continent as a whole. Nigeria is a poor, heavily debt-ridden
and ethnically divided country, despite its oil-producing wealth. Furthermore, factors
such as under-employment, technological backwardness and low productivity output
contribute to the country's woes. Nigeria also has a serious problem with its lack of
functioning infrastructure these include transport, telecommunications and electricity
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(Ero, 2000101: 189; 191). Nigeria also continues to remain an ethnically and religious
divided country.
4.2.1 Ethnic Tension Within Nigeria
Nigeria is a country with approximately 300 different ethnic groups, each with its
own language, culture, customs and traditional forms of government. Even before
independence, politics has been dominated by the three majority groups the Yoruba,
who are predominant in the west, the Hausa-Fulani, in the north, and the Igbo, in the
south. With the result being that many minority communities of the Niger Delta feel
they have been excluded from political participation and the economic and social
benefits enjoyed by dominant majority groups (Durotoye, 2000:8).
Nigeria's transition from military to democratic rule has not been accompanied with
political stability. Instability continues to stem from ethnic, religious and resource
matters. Arguably, the largest obstacle to a thriving Nigerian democracy continues to
be the ongoing religious and ethnic divisions. Tension has also further been fuelled by
the introduction of the Muslim judicial system, Sharia, in some parts of the Northern
states (Durotoye, 2000:7; Ero, 2000101: 192).
As a result of the highly factionalist nature of the political elites in Nigeria, ethno-
regional conflicts have been at the heart of the country's politics. It has been argued
that what is currently at stake, is a "balance of forces" due to the fact that old northern
elites are weighing up their gains and losses under a southern-based political control.
Linked to this is the fact that Obasanjo's ties with the military as well as the support
of the northern elites ensured his election victory in 1999. The tension however,
comes in with the fact that Obasanjo's main political supporters are in the south,
predominantly among the Yorubas with the result that the north now perceive their
political base to be under threat (Ero, 2000101: 192).
4.2.2 The Volatile Niger Delta Region
The Niger Delta, one of the world's largest wetlands, and the site of most of Nigeria's
biodiversity, housing approximately fifty to one hundred different linguistic and
ethnic groups, is also the area where the main oil reserves are found. Not surprisingly
therefore, it is also the region experiencing the greatest tension. Clashes arose during
the 1990s with numerous groups challenging the federal, state, local government and
multinational companies over the distribution of oil revenues. Competition for
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resources has become intense, coupled with the feeling of ongoing marginalisation
and poverty among the different ethnic groups, has resulted in frequent communal
conflict becoming the norm (Ero, 2000/01: 193).
Having no alternative therefore, government was forced to seek a solution to the
continuing conflict. A solution manifested itself in a bill being passed by government,
namely, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). This bill promulgates
the implementation of certain projects to facilitate development in the region that
produces up to 90% of the country's foreign earnings. In addition to this bill being
passed a clause in the constitution stipulates that at least thirteen percent of oil
revenue will be allocated to states where oil is produced (Ero, 2000/01: 193).
4.3 The Nigerian Labour Market
As in the case of the discussion of the South African labour market, an understanding
of union activities can facilitate analyses of recent economic changes in Nigeria.
Furthermore it also contributes to a broadly comparative assessment of organised
labour's role in the processes of democratic transitions. Again as was seen in the
South African case in the role in which COSATU played in the democratic transition.
4.3.1 The Labour Market During Military Rule
When President Babangida voided the presidential elections of June 1993 and
postponed indefinitely the redemocratisation process, the Nigeria Labour Congress
organised and directed several large strikes and protests that crippled major urban
centres. Also, despite having been weakened due to Nigeria's economic crisis, the
labour movement has continued to be the largest autonomous interest group in
Nigerian politics since the start of military rule. Furthermore a discussion on labour
movements is also essential in that the degree to which labour movements are
included in the re-democratisation process, often affects the level of political stability
of post-reform regimes. (Tuman, 1994: 27). It should however, at the start be noted
that an absence of research on Nigerian workers and unions does exist due to the fact
that since the early 1980s, there have been few, systematic studies of labour and
management in Africa.
Unions and organised workers in Nigeria have generally faced an uncertain political
climate in which to operate. Especially heightened during the military regime
between the periods of 1985 and 1986, the National Economic Powers Decrees
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permitted the state to intervene in the internal affairs of unions and the Nigeria
Labour Congress (NLC), to restrict and ban worker protests, to decertify some
militant unions, and to limit strike actions (Tuman, 1994: 32). Similarities therefore
exist between the Nigerian labour movement during this particular period and their
South African counterparts during the apartheid era since they too experienced the
restriction on worker mobilisation and mass protest.
Research also shows that during this period a strong correlation existed between the
emergence of the oil boom and the tendency toward increasing worker militancy
during the 1970s. This trend continued well into the early 1980s, including the first
years of the economic crisis. An illustration of this occurs in the period stretching
from October 1979 to March 1983 when an average of approximately 200 strikes per
year occurred. During the post 1983 period there was a significant reduction in both
the number of workers participating in strikes and the number of days lost to
industrial disputes. On closer inspection however, this should not be regarded as
being surprising since this period reflects the increasingly inhospitable environment
in which unions have had to bargain. Influenced by factors such as the threats of plant
closure, employer lockouts as well as unemployment (Tuman, 1994:33).
Not all the workers conformed to the pressure placed on them by government though.
Workers organised in strategically important sectors of the economy have generally
adopted more militant bargaining strategies. This fact is illustrated particularly in the
oil sector, since the country's continuing reliance on foreign exchange earned from oil
exports has rendered it vulnerable to disruptions in crude oil production. The National
Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) as an example, was
successful in resisting cutbacks and wage reductions proposed by the Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation in 1983 and 1987. Oil workers have continued to be
strike prone. Between 1990 and 1993, a number of successful strikes occurred. In
November 1992, workers shut down the Warri refinery just prior to the beginning of
the holiday season. Since this refinery provides a large share of Nigeria's domestic
fuel supply, managers were forced into negotiating a settlement that was favourable to
the union (Tuman, 1994: 34).
The Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) first emerged in 1975 as the result of a merger
between several national and regional trade union confederations. The government
formally disbanded the NLC in 1976 and although it was reconstituted by the state, it
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was re-organised. The re-organisation efforts had a radical effect on the structure of
the unions since the existing 1,200 unions were reconstituted into 42 national unions
(Tuman, 1994: 36).
4.3.2 The Labour Movement In Present Day Nigeria
To a significant degree, Nigerian labour has been excluded from participation in the
reform process. The leadership of the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), therefore, has
had little choice but to test the limits of authoritarian rule by protesting and engaging
in other forms of collective action.
The Constitution promulgated in May 1999, gives all citizens the right to freely
assemble and associate and to belong to any political party, trade union, or any other
association for the protection of their interests. However, the armed forces and
employees designated as essential by the Government may not join trade unions.
Total union membership is approximately 4 million. Approximately 10 percent of the
total work- force belongs to unions. The agricultural sector, which employs the bulk
of the work force, is not unionised. Most of the informal sector and practically all the
small businesses remain non unionised (Executive Report on Strategies in Nigeria,
2000: 51).
The Nigerian state has also fallen victim to many occasions of labour actions through
strike actions, protest marches, etc. The Nigerian Labour Congress had to embark on
a protest march to Aso rocks, the seat of power, in January 2000 to protest the
planned deregulation of the oil price. The Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff of
Nigeria (PENGASSAN) and the National Union Of Petroleum and Natural Gas
Workers' Union (NUPENG), which brought the country to a standstill in 1993 when
they went on strike for 8 weeks, went on strike again in March 2000 leading to a
scarcity of oil products for a few days (Durotoye, 2000: 6-7). In April 1999, all
primary and post-primary schools nationwide were shut down following a prolonged
strike action ordered by the Nigeria Union of Teachers, again in protest over
nonpayment of wages (Executive Report on Strategies in Nigeria, 2000: 51).
The most recent strike action occurred in January 2002 when the Nigeria Labour
Federation launched an indefinite general strike to protest an 18 percent jump in fuel
prices imposed at the start of the month. The Obasanjo government argued that the
increase was necessary to stimulate private investment in Nigeria and bring an end to
63
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
fuel shortages. The problem stems from the fact that even though Nigeria is the sixth
largest crude oil exporter in the world, the country does not have the refineries to
process its own oil, so it is forced to import gasoline to serve the population.
Government subsidises the price of gasoline that has been imported, fixing the price
at below a dollar a gallon, which is very cheap on an international scale. However, in
Nigeria, where two-thirds of the population earns less than a dollar a day, it still
remains quite expensive (Edwards, 2002: 1).
Being a fellow African country, Nigeria and South Africa share many labour market
ills that increase the investor perception of them as an investment risk cite and so
impedes the level of foreign investment received by them. Like most African
countries both South Africa and Nigeria suffer from high levels of unemployment, a
lack of formal education which prevents the development of manpower and
expansion of the labour pool, poor levels of labour productivity, the AIDS pandemic
as well as mass action in the form of strikes and the impact it has on the economy.
South Africa also exercises a form of government intervention in the form of
affirmative action, this is not so prevalent in Nigeria where it has to some extent been
implemented to make organisations more representative of the various tribes,
especially the three dominant ones, religious representatively i.e. as far as possible
equal amounts of Christians and Muslims has also been emphasised. What Nigeria
does have however, and extensively so, is a problem with corruption. So much so,
that it has on various occasions been recognised as the most corrupt country. This title
does not bode well for its investor perception.
This fact has however, not dissuaded the big oil companies from investing in Nigeria
since some of them have been involved in corruption cases i.e. "buying" certain
officials in order to gain unhampered access to the oil fields. Each of the labour
market ills that Nigeria suffers from will now be discussed as well as compared to the
situation of the particular labour market issue in South Africa.
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4.3.3 Unemployment and Productivity in the Nigerian Labour
Market
The unemployment rate as defined in the previous chapter is, the percentage of the
labour force that is willing to work, but are unable to find jobs. No matter how one
defines unemployment, the underlying philosophy is that some people are without
jobs.
Within the period, 1980-1986, the year 1983 was particularly bad. The country's
unemployment rate was 10.2 percent. Specifically, between 1980 and 1986, the
country's annual average unemployment rate was 7.8 percent. During the period,
1987-1993, the annual average unemployment rate stood at 4.2 percent (Gbosi, 1996:
5-6).
The unemployment situation deteriorated during the first half of 1999 . Available data
showed that the National unemployment rate was 4.1% in March of 1999, and
estimated to rise to 4.7% in June of 1999 as against the rate of 3,9% in the
corresponding period of 1998. The Urban unemployment rate rose from 5.5% in June
1998 to 6.5%. Similarly, the rural unemployment rate stood at 3.9% as against the
3.5% in the corresponding period of 1998. The unemployment situation was further
exacerbated by the non- implementation of employment boosting policy measures
contained in the 1999 Budget. Furthermore, private sector employment generation
capacity was constrained by structural bottlenecks, including frequent power
shortages, infrastructural inadequacies and scarcity of petroleum products (Nigeria
Employment and Labour, 2002:2).
In South Africa, about 4,5 million people, representing 37,6% of an economically
active population of 12,1 million, were unemployed in 1997. This shows a significant
increase from the 1995 level of 29,2% (Naidoo, 1998: 39). According to Statistics
South Africa's Household Survey of October 1999, using the strict definition, the
unemployment rate was 23.3%. Reflecting a 4,0% increase i.e. from 19,3% in 1996.
Whereas using the expanded definition, the unemployment rate was 36,2%. This
reflects a 3,2% point increase over the 1996 figure of 33,0% (Statistics South Africa,
October Household Survey, 1999). South Africa, like most other developing
countries, has no accurate register of unemployment, therefore it seems that official
statistics reflecting the unemployment rate is to some degree, somewhat inadequate.
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Similarly, the unemployment rate of Nigeria should also be interpreted with caution,
as evidence abounds that unemployment loomed larger than indicated. Like most
statistics, unemployment statistics in Nigeria are not well documented. To a large
extent, statistics from the remote rural areas are apparently not available. If these
statistics were included, the unemployment rate would have been much higher than
those presented by government officials. Yet even if the official unemployment rate is
accepted, the problem of underemployment in Nigeria still persists (Oni, 2000: 3).
South Africa too, suffers from underemployment. In the South African economy
there is underemployment since there is an oversupply of unskilled workers for which
there is a lower demand and an undersupply of skilled workers, for which a higher
demand exists (Grosset, 1998: 127; Mohr, 1998: 80-89).
Nigeria's productivity growth affects the Nigerian standard of living. There are three
ways a country can increase the productivity of its resources. It can improve the
public capital that enables the private economy; it can raise the quantity and quality of
its business capital investment and it can improve the quality of its human capital.
With regards to business investment, successive governments have presided over
increasingly huge deficits driven by corruption, fiscal indiscipline and low tax
collection, this has created significant disincentives to private savings (Oni, 2000: 3).
In South Africa on the other hand, strikes have become a feature in the South African
economy and they necessarily mean lower productivity due to a substantial loss of
working hours. It has therefore been argued that an increase in productivity
necessarily implies an increase in the size of the South African economy and it would
therefore also lead to a reduction in unemployment. Research shows however, that
South Africa does in fact have rising labour productivity, even though employment is
still on the decline (Naidoo, 1998: 60).
Nigeria's labour market productivity is further hampered by ethnic and religious
tension and crises still inflict a large hidden economic cost in constraining capital
inflows. Also, though the present government has made moves towards transparency
and a clampdown on corruption, a framework of systems and processes that embody
this desired level of transparency still needs to be built and reinforced across
government departments (Oni, 2000: 3).
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As for public capital, the deficit laden federal government was too broke to sustain
any long-term capital spending on infrastructural projects. There is also Nigeria's
huge debt problem. Nigeria is yet to make a credible case for membership of the
HIPC (Highly Indebted Poor Countries), even though membership seems unlikely at
present, the country does need a significant mixture of debt restructuring and debt
forgiveness to ease the burden of debt servicing. Focusing on human capital, it
becomes evident that the tragic disinvesture in education and the brain drain
phenomenon - both of which surged in the late 80s through the 90s- are now showing
up in the country's productivity growth rate (Oni, 2000: 3). Thus the collapse in the
quality of education and access to education has probably had the most far reaching
consequence and is likely to be the most difficult to reverse (Oni, 2000: 3).
South Africa also suffers from the brain drain phenomenon. In South Africa the two
primary instigators for the huge numbers of qualified South Africans leaving our
shores is the high crime rate as discussed in chapter 3 as well as better financial
rewards overseas.
4.3.4 The State of Education in Nigeria
The dilapidated nature of the education sector in present day Nigeria has been blamed
on the many years of military misrule. There is the common feeling that the military
neglected the universities because of their opposition to military rule. Yet, with the re-
emergence of civil rule the nation's educational institutions still leave a lot to be
desired.
Nigeria has experimented with some educational programs, which has only served as
mechanisms with which to transfer money to the corrupt political leaders and their
cromes.
An illustration of this was when the nation launched the Universal Primary Education
(UPE) in 1976, but as noted, the programme failed due to lack of funds necessitated
by corruption. Government has also reported that the falling standard of education in
Nigeria is caused by the shortage of qualified teachers in the primary school level. It
has been estimated that approximately 23% of the teachers employed in the nation's
primary schools do not posses the Teachers' Grade Two Certificate. This ties in with
the report of UNICEF's state of the world's children report for 1999. This reported
highlighted that approximately four million Nigerian children have no access to basic
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education, and even the few that do have access are given sub-standard education
(Dike, 2002:2).
The Constitution's general provisions call for the Government, to provide free,
compulsory, and universal pnmary education. Yet, despite the President's
commitment to compulsory education, compulsory primary education rarely is
enforced. Research shows declining school enrollment due to continuing deterioration
of public schools and increased economic pressures on families. The lack of sufficient
primary school infrastructure has ended some families' access to education, forcing
them to place children in the labour market (Executive Report on Strategies in
Nigeria, 2000: 56).
Statistics show an illustration of this, it has been estimated that 2,015 primary schools
in Nigeria have no buildings of any type. Classes are held under trees, this leaves the
quality of education that is received in these conditions in serious doubt. Despite this
worrying statistic, the Nigerian government still allocates less money to the
educational sector when compared with other less affluent African countries. This is
illustrated by the percentage of gross national product (GNP) spent on education. In
comparison with Angola (4.9); Ivory Coast (5); Ghana (4.4); Kenya (6.5); Malawi
(5.4); Mozambique (4.1); Tanzania (3.4); Uganda (2.6), Nigeria only spent 0.76% of
its GNP on education, in comparison with the above-mentioned countries, South
Africa spent the largest percentage of its GNP on education i.e. 7.9% (Dike, 2002: 3-
4).
The above statistics illustrate how insufficient Nigeria's allocation to the educational
sector has been. It also illustrates the high priority given to education in South Africa
even though South Africa still struggles to provide equal and adequate education to
all its citizens. Reasons for this abound, in many rural areas in South Africa there is a
severe lack of infrastructure to accommodate schools, schools are also situated a
distance from where people live and children are only able to get there on foot, there
also continues to be to many students in classes with one teacher, making effective
teaching extremely difficult and last but certainly not least, South African teachers are
dying off due to the aids pandemic, again, a problem faced by most African countries.
Nigeria has to change her value system and invest in education, which remains the
intellectual laboratory of any nation.
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4.3.5 The Impact of AIDS in Nigeria
Nigeria is sitting on a ticking AIDS time bomb. Officially, the rate of HIV infection
in Nigeria is about 5.4 percent. In reality, the estimated 3 million Nigerians living
with HIV/AIDS are bigger than the population of many African nations. In Nigeria's
AIDS hot spots, mainly in the urban centers, the prevalence rates range from 15
percent among the adult population to 20 percent in pregnant women. AIDS will have
a detrimental impact on the labour market in Nigeria, since at present the infection
rate is estimated at being 70 percent among adults ages 20 through 39 (Akukwe,
2001: 1).
Nigeria, more than most African countries, presents a perfect comfort zone for AIDS
for numerous reasons. Nigeria has one of the highest rates of unsafe blood
transfusions in the world, at 14 percent. In some hospitals in Nigeria, 60 percent of
blood transfusions may not undergo internationally acceptable screenings. The culture
of silence and stigma about AIDS is widespread in Nigeria. Since although the UN
estimates that 1.7 million Nigerians have died of AIDS, hospitals still do not identify
AIDS-related illness as the cause of death on death certificates. This culture of silence
extends even to the estimated 971,472 Nigerian AIDS orphans (Akukwe, 2001: 2).
Poverty is endemic in Nigeria, with nearly 70 percent of the population living in
poverty. Poverty in every country as in South Africa is the Achilles' heel in the fight
against AIDS since it thrives and wallows in poverty-ridden communities. Nigeria
also continues to be crippled by its debt burden, spending $1.5 billion in debt
repayments in 2001 alone. The UN has also identified the lack of political will as
being a serious impediment to the fight against AIDS, this is illustrated perfectly in
Nigeria, since the politicians rarely reach consensus on anything. The rate of infection
in the powerful military is reportedly also on the increase. The Economic
Commission for Africa CECA) estimate that 15-20 percent of Nigerian soldiers live
with HIV/AIDS (Akukwe, 2001: 2).
The UN and other multilateral institutions identify poor healthcare infrastructure as a
major stumbling block to the various floating plans to supply AIDS drugs and other
essential medicines to African nations. Nigeria's chronic struggles with other basic
infrastructure such as road networks, water supply, sewers, sanitation, electricity and
telephones, etc. complicates any potential international relief effort. Another
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impediment to the fight against AIDS is the fact that the local system of government
in Nigeria is weak and incapable of implementing effective community-based AIDS
prevention and treatment programs. As a result, very little community mobilization
against AIDS has taken place in Nigeria. If the present trend of infection is not
reversed, and with one in five Africans a Nigerian, 75 million Nigerians will likely be
HIV positive or dying of AIDS. As discussed and illustrated in chapter 3, South
Africa, also has one of the fastest growing HIV epidemics in the world. Estimates of
the national HIV prevalence for the years 1990 to 1998 show a steady increase from
0.7% in 1990 to 22.8% in 1998. This indicates an increase of more than 30 times from
the beginning of the epidemic. Levels of HIV infection vary across different
geographic regions in South Africa. Of the nine provinces, KwazululNatal continues
to be the province with the highest prevalence, which showed an increase from
19.90% in 1996 to 32.5% in 1998, but no further increase in 1999. In contrast, the
Western Cape, whilst remaining the province with the lowest level of infection,
shows a 36.5% rate of increase from 5.2% in 1998 to 7.1% in 1999 (Department of
Health of the Republic of South Africa).
The epidemic potentially represents the biggest threat to the corporate existence of
Nigeria since it can trigger violent struggles for the control of national resources as
families and communities collapse from the untimely deaths of its most promising
citizens (Akukwe, 2001: 3). South Africa also already faces a looming crisis with the
epidemic killing off the economically active population at an astounding rate, the
huge number of teachers also dying of the disease, the increasing expense for caring
for infected people and last but not least, the increasing number of orphans as a result
of the AIDS pandemic.
4.4 The Impact of Corruption On Nigeria
Mention the words "corruption in Africa" and the first country that would spring to
mind is probably Nigeria. Mention Nigeria and the response would most times be
"what form of corruption is presently taking place?" Nigeria has become synonymous
with corruption and with good reason too.
Corruption is closely linked to the absence of citizens' influence and oversight and to
unresponsive and irresponsible political leadership. Corruption has been somewhat
narrowly defined as being the abuse of public office for private gain. Personal
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corruption is motivated by personal gain while political corruption is motivated by
political gain. A distinction my also be made between individual corruption and
institutional corruption. State corruption refers to criminal or otherwise unlawful
conduct by government agencies, or by officials of these agencies acting in the course
of their employment. Corruption is both a symptom and an outcome of poor
governance and as such it undermines development (African Development Report,
2001: 118).
In Nigeria corruption is known to be rife, pervasive and deeply entrenched. To most
outsiders, Nigeria conjures up images of rampant corruption, business fraud and
nepotism. Corruption is not just endemic but an integral part of the social fabric of
life in Nigeria. It had in the last decade, especially under the military regimes,
increased to the extent that it began to be asserted that in Nigeria, " it is not simply
that officials are corrupt, but corruption is official" (African Development Report,
2001:119).
4.4.1 Unsuccessful Past Reform Measures to Combat
Corruption
Attempts were made to rid the country of corruption without much success. The first
attempt to rid the nation of corruption was the termination of appointment and
administrative purges. This was illustrated by the massive purge of the public service
in 1975 in which over 10,000 public servants lost their jobs for corrupt activities,
inefficiency and ineffectiveness. A second strategy was the setting up of anti-
corruption boards, commissions, etc. Third was the attempt to locate the root of
corruption in politics and the antics of politicians. The fourth main strategy was to
situate corruption and the abuse of office within the larger problem of a general social
moral vacuum, the remedy for which is some form of moral regeneration. The
promulgation of a Code of Conduct and the principle of public accountability for
public officers was another anti-corruption device (African Development Report,
2001:119).
In spite of the various crusades against corruption in Nigeria, the epidemic remains
seemingly uncontainable. This is due to several reasons. First, a lot of the remedial
actions of these regimes were backward looking and self-protective. The anti-
corruption measures adopted by an incumbent regime in response to the corruption of
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4.4.2 Dealing With Corruption In Present Day Nigeria
its predecessors were often taken without touching its own. Seeing the splinter in your
brother's eye, while forgetting about the log in your own. Second, government
approach to the question of public accountability has mainly been ad hoc and non-
institutional. Since the very institutions that were to promote public accountability
were stifled by military decrees. Effective sanctions i.e. moral, social, political and
legal - are an essential part of an antidote against corruption. Also, the quality of
institutional structures that limit the temptation of elected leaders and bureaucrats will
be the most effective anti-dote against corruption in Nigeria (African Development
Report, 2001: 120).
With the transition to democracy new hope was also cultivated to sincerely attempt to
stop the flow of corruption i.e. new brooms sweep clean. This hope has been spurred
on by the fact that the first bill that was passed through parliament was the anti-
corruption bill. This bill aims to end widespread corruption among officials and civil
servants, also since the bill has been passed, the state-owned oil company NNPC has
had to publish its accounts. The war on corruption has changed Nigeria's image
abroad with the international community (African Development Report, 2001: 120).
South Africa's levels of corruption is nowhere near to that of Nigeria, although,
corruption has been known to occur. Arguably, to a large extent, it is thanks to the
ever present transparency of government that is constantly emphasised, which makes
corruption that much more difficult to exercise. Transparency has a positive effect on
investor perception as well. Investors know exactly where their money is being put
into and with a country with a fairly low level of corruption, investment risk decreases
that much more. With its high crime rate however, South Africa definitely gives the
corruption in Nigeria a run for its money. South Africa's problem with crime is world
renowned, having deterred both investors and tourists for a number of years. As
discussed in chapter 3, at a global level, South Africa has the highest rate of violent
crime. In 1999, a third of all crimes recorded by the police were violent. In the United
States, considered to be a relatively violent society, 15% of recorded crimes were
violent, while in Britain; the figure was only 6% (Nedbank ISS Crime Index, 2000).
The crime rate as discussed therefore continues to have a negative impact on
investment since it increases investor risk as well as on the citizens of a host country
since it deprives them of potential investment.
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4.5 Nigeria and the International Monetary Fund
Nigeria's relationship with the IMF has been more prominent and therefore arguably
of more relevance than its relationship with either the World Band or the World Trade
Organisation. The researcher has therefore chosen to focus predominantly on
Nigeria's relationship with the IMF. Nigeria has had a fairly turbulent relationship
with the IMF more so recently than ever before. In March of 2002, Nigeria
announced a dramatic break with the IMF. This move could prove detrimental to
Nigeria since the International Monetary Fund approval of Nigeria's economic
policies is important to the country winning relief on its foreign debt that is
approximated to be around $30 billion. The IMF criticised the Nigerian government's
2002 budget by saying that the proposed government's spending was too high and that
it would aggravate inflation in the country. It is this criticism that has been cited as
being the immediate cause of Nigeria's recent withdrawal from the IMF (Xinhua
News Agency, 2002).
The implications of the government's decision to quit the IMF Standby Accord in
March became evident on 3 July 2002, when the World Bank confirmed that the
country would not qualify for any debt relief under the bank's Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC) programme. Even though the World Bank has said that the
country's oil revenues enabled it to meet its debt repayments, its inability to meet the
Fund's prerequisites on public spending prompted the decision (West & Central
Africa Monitor, 2002: 2).
The conditions imposed by the IMF on Nigeria were the following: privatisation of
public utilities; retrenchment of government workers; servicing of external debt;
removal of subsidies in petroleum products; electricity; agriculture and foreign
exchange; reduce government spending; free entry and exit of foreign capital.
Nigeria's paying of the interest on its debt has also been prioritised, an amount which
is estimated at being $3.1 billion each year. This means that government has to set
aside 65% of the country's capital expenditure simply to service the debt. Thus the
amount Nigeria would have to pay in interest over the next ten years would be almost
equivalent to its present debt (Nigerian Marxist Journal, 2002: 2; Moser, 2002: 4;
Owusu, 2000: 23).
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By breaking away from the IMF, Nigeria finds itself in a predicament. On the one
hand if the policies enforced by the IMF continue to be applied mass movement from
below is a surety. Two general strikes and a wave of strikes involving practically
every section of the working class are sufficient proof of this. On the other hand,
sending the IMF packing has dire consequences. Since without an agreement with the
IMF, it would be difficult for Nigeria to get a rescheduling of its debt. This ties in
with the fact that Nigeria still has to pay its interest on its foreign debt. Consequently,
if it does not get a rescheduling agreement then it has to pay up the full amount due
and will not be able to get any further loans
(Nigerian Marxist Journal, 2002: 2; Moser, 2002: 4; Owusu, 2000: 23).
4.6 Conclusion
The aim of the above chapter was to highlight the current situation of the labour
market in Nigeria. The role and impact of the labour market on foreign direct
investment and investment risk has been pervasive throughout this study. This is due
to the fact that the labour market is the backbone to a country's economy and
therefore any change in any aspect of the labour market, necessarily has an impact on
levels of investment. This chapter compared the labour market in Nigeria and South
Africa and from the research it becomes clear that the two labour markets are quite
comparable. The labour market in both countries suffer from similar problems i.e.
unemployment or underemployment, lack of basic education, lack of labour
productivity, the AIDS pandemic, the high crime rate and in Nigeria's case numerous
accounts of corruption.
In focusing on the various policies that government has in place to promote foreign
investment in chapter two and the problems which face the respective labour markets
in the two countries under comparison in chapters three and four a foundation has
been laid for the next chapter. The perception of political risk in both South Africa
and Nigeria will be the focus of chapter five. As has been discussed earlier the
perception of risk whether justified or not has a tangible impact on level of
investment received. Taking into account the various factors discussed in the
preceding chapters, a model illustrating the levels of political, economic and social
risk in both countries respectively, will be sketched and discussed.
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Foreign Direct Investment And Political Risks In South Africa and
Nigeria: A Comparative Analysis
Chapter Five: Evaluating Political Risk in South Africa and Nigeria with the
Aid of a Model
5.1 The Relevance Of A Model Within The Field Of Political Risk
In this chapter the various models and methods of measurement that relate to the field
of political risk analysis will both be described and discussed. With this as a
foundation the researcher will evaluate the level of risk both South Africa and Nigeria
pose for the potential investor. This evaluation will manifest itself in the form of a
political risk model that will make use of numerous risk indicators that have been
discussed in previous chapters.
The Reader's Digest universal dictionary defines a model as being the following: 1) A
preliminary pattern or representation of an item not yet constructed, serving as the
plan from which the finished work, usually larger, will be produced; 2) A tentative
framework of ideas describing something intangible and used as a testing device.
One of the most simplistic definitions that Michael Pidd (1998: 13) borrows from
Ackoff and Sasieni, 1968, states that "a model is a representation of reality" Pidd
argues, and rightly so that even though this definition is attractive due to its simplicity
it is also extremely deficient. It is deficient in the sense that even though it says what
a model is, the possible reason why a model may be necessary, is not addressed. The
fact that a model has a specific use is alluded to in the definitions given by the
Reader's Digest dictionary i.e. "serving as a plan" and "used as a testing device"
Pidd (1998: 13) elaborates on the above definition incorporating the fact that a model
has to have some or other use, thereby redefining it, as "a model is a representation of
reality intended for some definite purpose." This purpose, for which the model is
necessary, is inevitably to help someone or an organisation gain greater clarity about
a possible future outcome. Pidd (1998: 13) therefore takes this defmition further by
stating, "a model is a representation of reality which is intended to be of use to
someone charged with managing or understanding that reality." Pidd (1998: 13)
criticises this definition as being too exclusive i.e. that models will only be of use to
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people in the upper echelons of an organisation. In revising the above definition he
therefore states "a model is a representation of reality intended to be of use to
someone in understanding, changing, managing and controlling that reality. " (Pidd,
1998: 13).
Having taken into account all the above definitions it still has to be noted that a model
remains a simplification of reality and as such it has inherent limitations. Despite this
however, it should also be recognised that their usefulness lies within their
approximations and therefore being exact is not important since it is not a prerequisite
for them to be useful (Pidd, 1998: 18).
Models do however act as a means in which to manage risk and uncertainty (Pidd,
1998: 29). It is therefore not surprising that they have become a prominent feature in
the field of political risk analysis. When applying the use of model in the field of
political risk analysis as will be done in this study with regard to South Africa and
Nigeria, the definition created and refined by Charlotte Brink, 2002 in her study,
becomes exceptionally useful and also very applicable. Brink (2002: 52) moulds the
definition of a model to suit the parameters of political risk analysis by defining a
model for political risk analysis as " an extended representation of a certain potential
host country's political and overall business and investment climate as viewed by
potential foreign investors, political risk analysts and host governments, that wish to
use the model for political risk analysis in order to better understand and
comprehend, adapt to, manage and control the identified political risk factors the
model is specifically designed for to deal with (Brink, 2002: 52).
Brink further qualifies this definition by stating that when analysts busy themselves
with the work of political risk analysis, they are in fact already managing the political
risks that have the potential to negatively impact upon foreign investment (Brink,
2002: 52). Therefore the creation, development and refinement of political risk
models are so important, since even though they may not be exact, they allow a
framework from which analysts are able to make decisions and therefore manage and
control potential outcomes. Before evaluating the level of political and country risk
by means of a model for South Africa and Nigeria the following sections will briefly
discuss the already existing models specifically catering for political risk analysis.
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5.2 Conceptual Models Within The Field Of Political Risk Analysis
5.2.1 The Bronfenbrenner Model
As mentioned, the study of political risk first really gained momentum in the late
1950s consequently this is also the time period in which models were constructed
with which to aid the study of political risk. One of the pioneer models constructed
was that of Martin Bronfenbrenner. Bronfenbrenner argues that confiscation has the
potential to be a viable alternative to in some cases increase the rate of or redirect
economic development. His argument concludes with that if the appeal of
confiscation makes economic sense, it should increase with time. Chermak (1992:
168) criticises this model since confiscation has indeed not always made economic
sense. Due to the fact that even though confiscation has in some instances been used
as a means with which to increase economic development, it has not always been
successful in doing so. Chermak (1992: 168) cites examples of this being the
nationalisation of the US operated copper mines in Chile as well as the nationalisation
of the Zambian and Zaire copper industries. Bronfenbrenner's model is further
deficient in that not only is it not empirically supported, but it has also been
qualitatively disproved by history (Chermak, 1992: 169).
5.2.2 Johnson's Model Of Political Risk
Harry Johnson's model has also been termed as "the model of economic nationalism"
this is what political risk was formerly regarded as being. To form his model, Johnson
borrows from several other sources, so giving rise to what has been termed as being
his "psychic satisfaction" approach to expropriation. In his argument he states that the
governmg elites together with the population of a developing country are often
willing to sacrifice material advantage for the psychic satisfaction of nationalistic
acts. Examples of so-called nationalistic acts include expropriation of foreign
controlled companies as well as the displacement of foreigners by nationals in high
prestige jobs (Chermak, 1992: 169). This model is deficient in the sense that it to a
large extent relies on speculation, focusing on emotion (feelings of nationalism) and
in the process ignoring the crux of a model i.e. to investigate political risk and there is
also no empirical evidence with which to substantiate this model (Chermak, 1992:
170).
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5.2.3 Vernon's "Obsolescing Bargain" Model
This model developed in 1971 by Raymond Vernon was specifically focused on
explicating the power dynamics between foreign firms in the extractive industry and
host governments. According to this model, at the beginning of an extractive project
the firm holds the majority of the power due to the fact that the host government does
not possess the financial means or expertise to develop the project on its own. As a
result, the initial concession granted may be weighted in favour of the investor.
However, after the project is on line and profitable, a change rapidly occurs within the
foreign firm / host country power structure. Resulting in the host government gaining
the upper hand by using whatever permanent structure was constructed by the foreign
firm as a bargaining chip to renegotiate a more attractive contract (Chermak, 1992:
170). Vernon's model carries with it much credibility as it has been known to occur in
many developing countries as is stated by Moran (1974: 10), few large natural
resource concessions in underdeveloped countries remain unchanged for long.
The diversity of the above models has been ascribed to the different times at which
they were developed as well as in relation to the diversity of the backgrounds of the
researchers i.e. some stemming from a political science background and others from
an economic background (Chermak, 1992: 170).
5.3 Present Methods In Which To Measure Political Risk
As argued at the beginning of this chapter, no exact method or model exists with
which to successfully measure the occurrence of political risk. Constructing or
developing a suitable method or model has also further been impeded by the fact that
the field of political risk consists of a variety of factors i.e. including both political
and economic factors and the problem arises with the fact that whereas most
economic factors would to a large extent be quantifiable and therefore measurable,
most political factors are not as easily quantifiable, if at all.
The question therefore arises whether or not there is in fact an adequate method for
measuring political risk? Investment. decision is dependent on levels of political risk
indeed this is the core purpose of political risk analysis i.e. to assist in investment
decision. Thus measurement methodologies are likely to be used in the context of five
main types of decision: 1) whether or not to invest; 2) when planning for performance
expectations and investment tolerances; 3) how much to invest; 4) deciding the type
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of investment to be made and 5) the ability to deploy suitable strategies for the
management of political constraints (Andrews, 1995: 60; Howell, 1983: 47; Keegan,
1974: 12).
The measurement methodologies that will briefly be discussed below include: the
"grand tour" and "old hands" approach; the Delphi model; the BERI and BI method;
the WPRF method as well as the PSSI index (Chermak, 1992: 173-174; Howard,
1993: 60; Andrews, 1995: 60).
5.3.1 The "Grand Tour" And "Old Hands" Approach
The" grand tour" is simply a visit to the country in question by the top management of
the company. From that visit, investment decisions are made. Howard (1993: 58)
states that such tours are ideal in a number of ways, providing opportunities to meet,
look, and listen i.e. to experience the investment environment and its reaction to
investors. Yet at the same time it should be noted that tour schedules might become
clogged with "top level" briefings in which negative information may be glossed over
or ignored altogether. The tour therefore ends up becoming more of a recruiting visit
than an on-the-scene investigation into potential risk factors. Thus if this is the only
analysis carried out, it is at best subjective and at worst subjective and uninformed
(Chermak, 1992: 173; Howard, 1993: 58-59).
The "old hands" approach incorporates the opinions of people with experience in the
country. Since it is opinions that are the deciding factor it should be noted that they
might be both subjective as well as biased and consequently any decisions taken
might have questionable reliability and validity (Chermak, 1992: 173).
5.3.2 The Delphi Method
This method was created in 1953 as a method for eliciting and refining group opinion
making. This method is regarded as being an improvement on the "old hands"
approach, since opinions are gained through a structured interview system, from
several people who are considered knowledgeable. A decision is reached based on
these opinions and it is regarded as supposedly being less biased since the decision is
gained from a variety of opinions (Chermak, 1992: 173; Andrews, 1995: 60).
The Delphi procedure is designed to 1) minimise possible biasing effects in decision-
making due to dominant individuals; 2) eliminate irrelevant communications among
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members of the group or panel of experts and 3) reduce group pressure towards
conformity of opinion. The procedure has three main elements: anonymous response,
iteration and controlled feedback, as well as statistical group response (Andrews,
1995: 61).
This method is however not flawless, the deficiencies which exist within this method
include the following: 1) questionnaire design together with the specification of the
dimensions of the measures; 2) problems of selection and availability of a team of
experts; 3) control and motivation of the experts and 4) interpretation and utilisation
of the results (Chermak, 1992: 173; Howard, 1993: 60; Andrews, 1995: 62). As has
been stated before in this study, political risk assessment involves not always equal
quantities of both factual observations and value-judgements. Analysts should keep
this fact at the back of their mind together with the fact that questionnaire
construction can result in biased assessments, taking these two factors into account, it
I
still should be noted that this method could be used with a fair degree of confidence
in the assessment of business-government relations (Andrews, 1995: 62).
5.3.3 The BERI and BI Method
According to Chermak (1992: 173) among the best known and most used quantitative
methods for the macro-assessment of political risk, based on expert opinion, include
that of Haner's Business Environment Risk Index (BERI) and Business International's
Country Assessment Service (BI). BERI, as described by Haner (1981: 20), includes
15 weighted variables that are regarded as being related to political risk. Examples of
these variables include political stability, foreign investment attitude, monetary
inflation, bureaucratic delays, currency convertibility as well as professional support.
BI uses a similar technique to BERI but with different variables and different scoring
techniques. Not surprisingly therefore, the predictions from BERI and BI have been
found to be similar (Haner, 1981: 20; Chermak, 1992: 174; Andrews, 1995: 63).
The above two methods has been criticised in that even though they do offer a
formalised assessment, this assessment is not based on an explicit model of the
political system as it relates to business and Kobrin has also furthermore argued that
assessments tend to be subjective and that weighting does not give a true indication of
the importance of a factor (Kobrin, 1978: 115; Haner, 1981: 20; Chermak, 1992: 174;
Andrews, 1995: 64).
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5.3.4 The World Political Risk Forecasts (WPRF) Method
The WPRF method has an 18-month forecast as well as a five-year forecast, both
based on the evaluations from approximately 250 experts from various countries. The
regime most likely to be in power as well as a risk rating for expropriation in
manufacturing and mining are some of the potential risks which the 18-month
forecast sets out to predict. The five-year forecast on the other hand, gives a single
letter grade that reflects the general level of political risk in the country (Chermak,
1992: 174; Andrews, 1995: 67). This method borrows to some extent from the Delphi
method in that expert panel evaluations offer a check for systematic differences
between countries and a hedge against a firm's possible internal bias (Chermak, 1992:
174).
Chermak (1992: 174) presents three critiques to the above methods. He argues that
firstly, due to a lack of empirical and statistical testing of the factors used, one needs
to assume the implication of potential subjectivity. Since, more subjectivity and bias
may be introduced when analysis is based on personal opinion and numerous
opinions does not necessarily mean no, bias. Also, at the impossibility of the
elimination of subjectivity and bias, Chermak (1992: 174) notes that the above
methods end up being nothing more than a ranking system and therefore cannot easily
be incorporated into economic analysis.
5.3.5 The Political System Stability Index (PSSI)
This index uses three indices i.e. 1) socio-economic and economic condition of the
country; 2) societal conflict and 3) political and governmental processes, to generate
an overall score, which can be either positive or negative. A negative number
indicates political risk. PSSI, to a certain extent, justifies the use of stability as a
measure of political risk. The critique of this type of model however, is that it
measures the probability of revolution or mass political violence and that these acts
do not necessarily lead to increased political risk. Since research shows that more
subdued acts may also lead to political risk due to non-market or political forces
(Chermak, 1992: 175; Andrews, 1995: 70).
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5.4 Developing Risk Models For South Africa And Nigeria
The aim of the discussions in the preceding chapters as well as the above section was
to lay the foundation for the section that follows below. The section that follows
below will be the construction of a hypothetical risk model for both South Africa and
Nigeria. Although hypothetical, the model is based on a legitimate risk model
developed by Charlotte Brink (2002:54). Furthermore, it also follows to a certain
degree established risk models i.e. Mode's Investor Services; The International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) rating system as well as that of Standard and Poors, it is
therefore all inclusive and has refined similar indicators as the ones used by the above
compames.
5.4.1 The Risk Model
The risk model used in this makes use of both qualitative and quantitative analysis.
For the purpose of this study, only three categories will be focused on i.e. Economic
Risk; Political Risk and Social Risk. Most other risk models make use of a fourth
category as well i.e. Industry Risk. Industry Risk is however, beyond the scope of this
study, since it was not the objective of this study to focus on any particular industry in
either South Africa or Nigeria. One ofthe objectives of this study is to give an overall
indication of the level of risk within both South Africa and Nigeria and so to give a
general overview of the investment climate to the potential investor.
Each of the three categories contains a wide scope of indicators, indicators that it
should be noted, this particular researcher found necessary for this particular study.
These indicators may therefore vary slightly from other indicators used in other risk
models.
5.4.2 Economic Risk Within The Model
The model consists of six economic indicators, with each indicator, except for
external debt, weighing 10 points. External debt for this particular model will be
weighted out of 20, due to the fact that investors evaluate the level of external debt as
an indication of the country's economic health. As previously discussed, Nigeria
continues to struggle with an enormous external debt, having a large amount of
external debt has been known to dissuade potential investors. Since it not only poses
problems for the host country, but also for the foreign investor or company.
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Individual economic indicator ratings are added up to a total out of 70 points. The
closer to zero the rating; the lower the risk.
5.4.3 Political Risk Within The Model
There are ten political indicators that are weighted out of 10, again, except for strikes.
Unionisation and the mobilisation of labour were discussed at length in both the
South African and Nigerian cases. As mentioned, the South African labour
movements played an instrumental role in South Africa's transition towards
democracy. And today, even though union membership is on the decline, the unions
are still a force to be reckoned with i.e. they still have the power to bring the entire
country to an economic standstill simply by engaging in a strike for a few days. Many
potential investors have cited the mobilisation of labour as one of the main reasons
for their decision not to invest in the country. Therefore this researcher deemed it
necessary to give the "strikes" indicator more weight than the other indicators within
the political risk rating. It should be noted however, that this does not minimise the
importance of the other indicators within this category. Individual political indicator
ratings are added up to a total out of 110points. The closer to zero the rating; the
lower the risk.
5.4.4 Social Risk Within The Model
The model uses ten social indicators, all weighted out of 10 except for the literacy
rate indicator and the AIDS pandemic indicator. First, literacy rate of a host country
has continued to gain increasing importance for a potential investor. With the increase
of technological advancement, the search for cheap, unqualified labour has steadily
declined. Foreign Direct Investment often includes the transfer of both knowledge
and technology and as such the investor saves on additional expenses of having to
train the locals of the host country, when they already have some degree of literacy
i.e. thereby aiding and simplifying the process of knowledge and technological
transfer.
The impact of the AIDS pandemic on the labour market and consequently on the
investors in both South Africa and Nigeria has also been discussed at length in
chapters: three and four. AIDS is problematic since it targets the economically active
labour market and with this section of the population dying out, there will be very
little people left to actually do the work. Related to this is the future exorbitant
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medical expense that workers will become to the company e.g. regular medical
checkups and absenteeism, etc. and so this medical expense, will eventually transform
into an enormous economic expense. Investors will then be left questioning whether
or not the rewards really outweigh the risks. Social Indicator ratings are added up to a
total out of 120 points. The closer to zero the rating; the lower the risk.
5.4.5 The Final Overall Country Risk Rating
The final overall country risk rating is measured out of 300, and is reached as follows:
CCR = 1/3 (ER+PR+SR)
CCR: Country Risk Rating
ER: Economic Risk Rating
PR: Political Risk Rating
SR: Social Risk Rating
5.5 Evaluating The Risks In Nigeria And South Africa
5.5.1 Nigeria
5.5.1.1 The Economic Risk Rating
Economic risk factors are assigned with a rating of 0-10, except for, as has been
discussed, external debt. 0 being the complete absence of risk and 10 being high risk,
in the case of external debt, the range will be from 0-20, with 20 representing high
risk. A composite total economic rating is given as: Very Low Risk (0-10); Low Risk
(11-21); Low-Moderate Risk (22-32); Moderate Risk (33-43); Moderate-High Risk
(44-54); High Risk (55-65) and Very High Risk (66-70). Given the number of
indicators, the total economic risk is counted out of 70.
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Economic Indicators
GDP Growth Rate 8
5
6
8
17
5
49/70
Inflation Rate
Foreign Exchange Reserves
Balance of Payments
External Debt (20)
Investment Promotion Policies
Total Risk (Moderate-High Risk)
5.5.1.2 The Political Risk Rating
Political risk factors are assigned with a rating of 0-10, except for, the "strikes"
indicator. 0 being the complete absence of risk and 10 being high risk, in the case of
"strikes"; the range will be from 0-20, with 20 representing high risk. A composite
total political risk rating is given as: Very Low Risk (0-15); Low Risk (16-31); Low-
Moderate Risk (32-47); Moderate Risk (48-63); Moderate-High Risk (64-79); High
Risk (80-95) and Very High Risk (96-110). Given the number of indicators, the total
political risk is counted out of 110.
Political Indicators
Regime Legitimacy
Past Military Rule
Violent Regime Changeover
Influence of the Military
One Party Dominant State
Religion Dominant Government
Tensions Within The Region
5
8
6
8
6
8
4
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Possibility of Being Overthrown by Military
Corruption
8
8
12
73/110
Strikes (20)
Total Risk (Moderate-High Risk)
5.5.1.3 The Social Risk Rating
Social risk factors are assigned with a rating of 0-10, except for, the literacy rate
indicator and the AIDS pandemic indicator. 0 being the complete absence of risk and
10 being high risk, in the case of the literacy rate indicator and the AIDS pandemic
indicator, the range will be from 0-20, with 20 representing high risk. Given the
number of indicators, the total social risk is counted out of 120. A composite total
social risk rating is given as: Very Low Risk (0-17); Low Risk (18-35); Low-
Moderate Risk (36-53); Moderate Risk (54-71); Moderate-High Risk (72-89); High
Risk (90-107) and Very High Risk (108-120).
Social Indicators
Literacy Rate (20) 15
Unemployment 6
Religious Tension 8
Ethnic Tension 8
Communications Media 6
Transportation Systems 6
Infrastructure 8
Affirmative Action 5
Crime Rate 6
AIDS Pandemic (20) 17
Total Risk (Moderate-High Risk) 85/120
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5.5.1.4 Overall Country Risk: Nigeria
Economic Risk
Political Risk
Social Risk
Total Risk
49170
73/110
85/120
207/300
5.5.2 South Africa
5.5.2.1 The Economic Risk Rating
Economic Indicators
GDP Growth Rate 6
Inflation Rate 5
Foreign Exchange Reserves 5
Balance of Payments 6
External Debt (20) 12
Investment Promotion Policies 5
Total Risk (Moderate Risk) 39/70
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5.5.2.2 The Political Risk Rating
Political Indicators
Regime Legitimacy
Past Military Rule
Violent Regime Changeover
Influence of the Military
One Party Dominant State
Religion Dominant Government
Tensions Within The Region
Possibility of Being Overthrown by Military
Corruption
Strikes (20)
Total Risk (Moderate Risk)
3
2
4
4
5
4
6
4
6
17
55/110
5.5.2.3 The Social Risk Rating
Social Indicators
Literacy Rate (20) 15
Unemployment 7
Religious Tension 3
Ethnic Tension 3
Communications Media 3
Transportation Systems 5
Infrastructure 3
Affirmative Action 7
Crime Rate 8
AIDS Pandemic (20) 17
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I Total Risk (Moderate Risk) 71/120
5.5.2.4 Overall Country Risk: South Africa
Economic Risk 39/70
55/110
71/120
165/300
Political Risk
Social Risk
Total Risk
5.5.3 Country Risk Rating For South Africa And Nigeria
With: Very Low Risk (0-14), Low Risk (15-29), Low-Moderate Risk (30-44),
Moderate Risk (45-59), Moderate-High Risk (60-74), High Risk (75-89), and Very
High Risk (90-100).
5.5.3.1 South Africa
CRR = 1/3 (ER+PR+SR)
= 1/3 (39+55+71)
= 1/3 (165)
= 55/100
According to the above model, South Africa therefore has a moderate risk.
5.5.3.2 Nigeria
CRR = 1/3 (ER+PR+SR)
= 1/3 (49+73+85)
= 1/3 (207)
= 69/100
According to the above model, Nigeria therefore has a moderate-high risk.
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5.6 Conclusion
The aim of the above discussion was to provide a comprehensive understanding of the
nature of political risk and all the factors that have to be taken into account when
evaluating levels of political risk within a specific country. To place the model used
in this chapter in context, it was first necessary to describe and discuss the various
methods and models already available in the evaluation of political risk. As
mentioned, no model or method is flawless and each of them in their own way, suffer
from notable shortcomings, so too the model utilised within this study. This is due to
the fact that even though it is based on a legitimate model, the researcher has chosen
indicators deemed necessary for a study that focuses on South Africa and Nigeria, at
the possible neglect of other indicators.
The findings i.e. that South Africa poses a moderate risk and Nigeria a moderate-high
risk are not too surprising. The economic risk rating was fairly straightforward, these
indicators are important when evaluating any country. Nigeria and South Africa's
inflation rate indicator was given the same weight, since South Africa, especially this
year has suffered from numerous inflation increases and currency fluctuations. The
importance of external debt has been discussed and so too the weight given to
Nigeria's external debt exceeds that of South Africa.
Nigeria also far outweighs South Africa with regard to political risk rating. Nigeria
has for the most part been a military regime, South Africa, having had two successful
democratic elections, can be regarded as being a legitimate regime. As previously
discussed, corruption is also far more endemic in Nigeria than in South Africa, where
strike action and the mobilisation of labour has more dominance (Tuman, 1994: 13;
Durotoye, 2000: 17).
With regard to the social risk rating, Nigeria suffers far more than South Africa with
regard to religious and ethnic tension, hence the huge difference in the weight given
to the indicators. South Africa also fairs better with regard to transportation systems
(although only slightly), communications media and infrastructure. Both countries
suffer from a low literacy rate as well as the present and potential destruction of the
AIDS pandemic (Whatley, 2000: 32; Garner, 1993: 12; Tuman, 1994: 14; Michalet,
90
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
1997: 22).
All of these indicators as well as the impact on their particular country's investor
perception have been discussed at length in previous chapters i.e. chapter three and
four. It has therefore not been deemed necessary for the researcher to explain the
impact of each indicator in detail once again. The chapter that follows this chapter
will be the sixth and final chapter of this study. In this chapter a brief overview will
be given of the preceding chapters, their findings and the way in which they
contribute to the answering of the questions posed in the first chapter. The researcher
will also discuss the potential shortcomings of this study, at the end of the chapter;
recommendations will be made for future research on the topic of this study as well as
related topics.
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Juanita Pekeur 12966355
Foreign Direct Investment And Political Risks In South Africa and
Nigeria: A Comparative Analysis
Chapter Six: Conclusion
6.1 A Brief Summary of the Study
The aim of this chapter is not to repeat what has already been discussed in previous
chapters, but rather to state the way in which these chapters have contributed to the
conclusion of this study and whether it has indeed answered or provided more clarity
on the questions posed at the start of this study.
The aim of this study was to answer the research questions posed in chapter one i.e.
addressing the phenomenon of foreign direct investment and political risk in South
Africa and Nigeria. Specifically focusing on the possible reasons why South Africa's
level of foreign direct investment is not on par with levels in Nigeria and what South
Africa could do to increase its level of foreign direct investment. In answering the
above questions it was also therefore necessary to have an in depth discussion of
perceived levels of political risk within both countries since these two phenomena are
interdependent.
In chapter two, the importance of governmental policies was addressed. This was
regarded as necessary for this study because governmental investment friendly
policies as well as a country's international relations goes a long way in impacting on
the perception that foreign investors have of a particular country and as such the level
of foreign direct investment that they are willing to invest in a country. With regard to
attracting foreign investment, South Africa implemented the RDP programme in
1994, the GEAR plan of 1996 and most recently, NEPAD.
In chapter three the South African labour market was discussed, specifically focusing
on the impact of unionisation in South Africa. South Africa has always had a strong
and influential union movement, so much so, that in many ways it has become a
deterrent factor for foreign direct investment. The impediments that the South African
labour market suffers from are also addressed in this chapter. The impediments
referred to include unemployment, education, labour productivity, the AIDS
pandemic, the employment equity legislation, strikes as well as the high South
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African crime rate. These impediments have not only become obstacles to economic
growth but as this study has argued it also inhibits substantial amounts of foreign
direct investment since these impediments indeed contribute to economic, political
and social risk. They therefore need to be earnestly addressed if the investment
climate is to improve in South Africa. This has been a comparative study of South
Africa and Nigeria and the comparison between the two countries takes place in
chapters four and five.
Chapter four compares the labour market in Nigeria with that of South Africa and the
chapter clearly shows that the two labour markets are quite comparable, suffering
from the same impediments. Despite this fact however, Nigeria still receives more
foreign direct investment than South Africa, while posing a higher political risk.
The aim of chapter five was to provide an in-depth discussion of political risk. With
the aid of a political risk model, the perceived level of political risk within both
countries was evaluated, concluding with the findings that South Africa poses a
moderate political risk in comparison with Nigeria, which poses a medium-high
political risk. It should be noted that even though this study has attempted to be as
thorough as possible, there are some aspects that have been neglected both due to time
constraints and in some cases being beyond the scope of this study.
6.2 Recommendations And Future Research
6.2.1 Recommendations
Research (Dahl, 2002: 9) has shown that whatever their country of origin, whatever
their industrial sector, there is a common core to most international investors' views
about what makes a particular country attractive for investment. The major
determinants of investment site location can be regarded as being political and
economic stability and basically non-harassing government behaviour, market
potential, and technological capacity. Government policy also remains key to
attracting FDI and promoting economic growth and employment. The quality of
education also remains a priority since it is becoming increasingly attractive to invest
in countries that offer a pool of skilled labour. Government should therefore focus on
increasing the enrolments at secondary and tertiary institutions, thereby providing a
trainable and efficient workforce that is attractive to foreign investors. Since basic
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education increases the rate of return on investment because it enables acquisitions of
essential skills to enhance labour productivity and income.
Risk perceptions are an important influence on investment behaviour. Africa is
perceived to be a high-risk continent with investors exposed to uncertainty over
sustainability of reforms, the threat of policy reversals and political and civil unrest.
Also, by pushing up the costs of doing business, Africa's inadequate and deteriorating
physical infrastructure has inhibited capital accumulation undermining the continent's
competitiveness in global markets (Dahl, 2002: 10; Sader, 2000:30; Narula, 1996: 5).
FDI can in a simplified way be regarded as being market-oriented (access to a
market), resource-oriented (access to natural resources) or efficiency-oriented, such as
with oil in Nigeria. As mentioned, Nigeria alone, accounts for a quarter of FDI flows
to Africa, thus underlining the central role of the primary commodities sector,
especially oil and gas, as a magnet for FDI. Investors in Africa are not surprisingly,
resource-oriented. Having thus compared South Africa and Nigeria one can conclude
that the reason for South Africa not receiving the same levels of FDI as Nigeria lies in
the fact that resource-driven FDI is less dependent on macro-economic stability and
national policy frameworks than market and efficiency-driven FDls (Dahl, 2002: 10;
Sader, 2000:30; Narula, 1996: 5).
6.2.2 Future Research
In this final section, areas for future research will be highlighted and briefly discussed .
•:. Administrative barriers
The above barriers should not be underestimated as an obstacle for FDI in Africa.
Research shows that the existence of administrative bureaucracy, the condition of
so-called "red tape", as a main obstacle for investment in many developing
countries. Since even though many Governments today have removed barriers to
investments as well as deregulated and liberalised administrative barriers, the
process continues to be slow in many instances .
•:. Africa's stereotypical perception by the rest of the world
The general poor reputation of Africa among investors at international level has
been identified as an important investment barrier for Africa. Due to this fact, it
has been argued that one way to promote investments to the African continent
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would be to turn around the general perception of Africa as a continent of
starvation, war and high risk for investors .
•:. Methods of collecting FDI information
The tools to be used in current research in order to scrutinise FDI are mainly
limited to highly aggregated figures provided by UN organisations. However, if a
more refined analysis is required for analyses of FDI and economic development,
then there definitely exists a need for more precise statistics. The analyses
concerning resource-driven, market-driven and efficiency-driven investment
would then be more reliable than is the present case .
•:. Further questions that need to be investigated include: how can the process of
reviewing and approving investment proposals and applications be effectively
streamlined? ; How can decision makers base their procedures for screening
and regulating FDI more predominantly on economic criteria rather than on
political considerations? ; Also, how should a developing country differentiate
its liberalisation of market seeking versus resource-seeking investments?
.:. With regard to political risk, further research is needed in the identifying and
measuring of non-quantitative constraints and opportunities afforded by less
concrete aspects of political risk .
•:. Comparative firm-specific case studies of the relationship between external
political risk effects should also be undertaken. This is in terms of identifying
political risk, and measuring its impact on the firm (Andrews, 1995).
In conclusion therefore it has become quite apparent that this particular topic has
the potential for much more research. The subject matter will also continue to gain
increased importance for both developed, but especially for developing countries.
It is with this fact in mind that future research should not be neglected and indeed
be encouraged.
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